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Starr:

Explaining Race Gaps in Policing:
Normative and Empirical Challenges
Sonja B. Starr*
January 19, 2015
This piece explores the many kinds of quantitative claims that researchers and
commentators regularly make about race and policing. Everyone agrees that there are enormous
racial gaps in U.S. rates of stops, arrests, searches, and use of force. But there are dramatically
conflicting claims as to why. Policing is hard to study, but the problem isn‟t just the data
shortcomings with which the literature has long struggled. It‟s confusion about what questions we
should be asking. Different kinds of numerical comparisons and research designs often imply sharply
differing conceptions of what racial equality in policing means. These normative premises often go
unstated, such that readers may easily miss these differences. The overarching objective of this Article
is to highlight the connection between the normative and the empirical. I identify plausible conceptions
of racial equality in policing and assess which empirical methods can best test those conceptions.
The Article gives particular attention to how researchers should address two important
research questions. The first is whether criminal conduct differences explain policing disparities.
Empirical researchers as well as casual commentators typically purport to address this question either
by comparing racial groups‟ shares of police interactions to their shares of crime, or by comparing two
groups‟ ratio of police interactions to their ratio of crimes. Using examples and mathematical proofs,
I show that neither of these comparison types answers the key question whether people with like
criminal conduct are being treated the same way. These comparisons generally overcorrect for racial
differences in criminal conduct, misleadingly masking the size (or even reversing the apparent
direction) of disparities in policing of people with the same conduct. Second, I examine how
researchers should investigate the effects of racial discrimination—a morally important and legally
central question, but one that poses serious causal inference challenges. I review several methods in
the current literature, which offer useful insights but have substantial limitations, and critique the
recently dominant “hit-rate” approach, which relies on faulty normative and empirical premises.
Instead, I propose supplementing existing tools with a new approach: the use of “testers.”
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INTRODUCTION
As recent events have painfully illustrated, public debates over race and policing
are typically catalyzed by flashpoints—individual, terrible cases, often involving
police killings of unarmed civilians. But these debates are shaped by competing
underlying understandings of the everyday realities of law enforcement. On average,
people of color in the United States, especially black men, interact with police far
more often than white Americans do. Black men are 2.5 times as likely to be arrested
as white men, and local studies show even larger gaps in stops, searches, and use of
force, though there are no national numbers. 1 The existence of these gaps is not
contested; the reasons are. Do these patterns reflect race-based targeting, or
differences in criminal conduct? Or are there other contributing factors—for
example, are citizens more likely to report crimes with minority suspects?
Such questions sharply divide public opinion—largely along racial lines2—and
among public commentators, polar opposite answers are each often presented as
essentially indisputable. 3 This dissensus does not merely result from one side or
another ignoring or twisting facts. Rather, these questions also have no clear answer
in the large empirical literature. The problem goes beyond heterogeneity across
locations and police forces, and beyond well-recognized data limitations. It stems in
part from normative and conceptual confusions that suffuse the field. Researchers
often do not articulate exactly what question they seek to answer and why
policymakers should care about it. Sometimes, they pose one question but use an
empirical model that effectively answers another.
This Article is an effort at clarity. It is written from an empiricist‟s perspective,
but isn‟t an empirical paper and doesn‟t answer the questions posed above. Instead,
it addresses threshold questions about research objectives and design: First, what
should policing-disparity studies seek to estimate, and why? Second, what empirical
strategies can best identify those quantities of interest? I hope this discussion will be
useful not just for researchers, but also for policymakers, judges, and citizens who
wish to make sense of the bewildering array of statistics on race and policing and to
recognize when those statistics are misleading.
There is no single answer to the question of what researchers should estimate;
the answer depends on the purpose of the research. But policing-disparity
researchers typically seek to inform policy or legal debates in some way, so they
See infra notes 7-22 and accompanying text (discussing raw disparity statistics).
E.g., Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen Perceptions, 83
SOCIAL FORCES 1009, 1017 (2005) (finding blacks are six times likelier than whites to believe racial
profiling is a problem).
3 For example, a recent letter from dozens of civil rights and community leaders called the pattern
of young black men subjected to “aggressive police tactics…too obvious to be a coincidence and too
frequent to be a mistake…[I]t is time for our country to counter the effects of systemic racial bias.”
Letter from Maya Rockeymoore et al., to President Obama (Aug. 25, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ad/public/static/letter/.
By
contrast,
prominent
commentator Heather Mac Donald stated: “It is black crime rates that predict the presence of blacks
in the criminal justice system. Not some miscarriage of justice.” Meet the Press, Aug. 17, 2014.
1
2
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should focus on some objective that matters (or should matter) to policymakers or
lawyers. When such researchers specify their empirical models, they are not just
making technical decisions. Rather, their choices imply normative judgments about
what racial equality in policing means and what inequalities are worth studying.
When researchers do not explicitly explain those judgments, it‟s easy for legal and
policy commentators to misunderstand the studies‟ implications. Sometimes,
researchers themselves seem to share those misunderstandings.
To illustrate these problems in more depth, much of this Article focuses on two
types of inequality that hold particular policy or legal interest: (1) disparity in police
interactions conditional on criminal conduct (that is, holding criminal conduct
constant); and (2) the causal effects of police racial discrimination. These are not the
only worthwhile targets of empirical research, but they are important ones.
Extensive research and commentary focuses solely on whether race gaps in
policing are explained by crime, ignoring other potential explanatory variables. This
literature contains a rich and important debate about how to measure crime, and I
offer thoughts on the competing methods. But I focus chiefly on unexamined
problems concerning what researchers should do with whatever crime measure they
settle on—that is, what does it mean to “account for crime”?
To explore this question, one first must ask why so many scholars and
commentators focus exclusively on crime‟s explanatory role. The answer isn‟t just its
descriptive importance. Rather, the shared assumption seems to be that crime
differences could potentially justify policing differences in a way that other
explanations cannot. The most plausible reasons for this assumption imply a
particular equality objective: people with the same criminal conduct should face the
same probability of police interactions, regardless of race. This principle is an
instantiation of the moral intuition that like cases should be treated alike.
But the specific types of policing-to-crime comparisons that pervade the
literature fail to test whether equality in this sense exists. The two common
approaches compare a group‟s share of police interactions to its share of crimes, or
compare the ratio of two groups‟ police interaction rates to the ratio of their crime
rates. The assumption is that racially equitable policing would produce a racial
distribution of police interactions that mirrors the distribution of crime. The basic
problem is that this would only be so if everyone the police interact with is guilty of
the crime(s) in question. In reality, though, few police interventions are confined to
the guilty. Even if the police are quite good (but not perfect) at targeting the guilty,
Share/Share and Ratio/Ratio comparisons can be surprisingly misleading.
As I show with examples and mathematical proofs, when there is racial equality in
policing of those with like conduct, Share/Share or Ratio/Ratio comparisons always
misleadingly suggest disproportionality—specifically, that the higher-crime group is
being “underpoliced” after accounting for crime. And when the higher-crime group
is in fact “overpoliced” on average conditional on criminal conduct, the common
comparisons mask those disparities‟ size, or even reverse their apparent direction.
The literature is thus rife with comparisons that overstate the extent to which race
gaps in police interactions can be explained by criminal conduct. (Even those arguing
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that crime does not fully explain policing gaps draw such comparisons, generally with
the effect of understating their arguments.) These comparisons seem intuitively
sensible, but our intuitions are wrong. While “accounting for crime” is a valid
objective, the specific ways crime is routinely “accounted for” exaggerate its
explanatory value. I offer thoughts on how we can get the right numbers instead.
The second estimand on which I focus, the effect of police racial discrimination,
is central to equal protection doctrine, and is also important for policy purposes; the
experience of being targeted because of race is a key reason why communities often
see heightened police presence as a burden. But empirically identifying racial
discrimination is difficult. It requires disentangling other potential causes of
disparity—not just criminal conduct, but other potential confounding variables,
some of which may be unobservable to researchers.
The literature has taken a variety of approaches to this problem. Economic
literature has recently been dominated by the “hit-rate” approach, which posits that
irrational police discrimination can be measured by comparing the rates at which
police actions produce evidence of crime. Unfortunately, although this approach is
mathematically elegant, it does not tell us anything we should care about. It is
unrelated to any defensible conception of either equality or efficiency, relies on
implausible empirical assumptions, and makes demonstrably false predictions.
More insight can be gained from various more traditional observational methods,
although significant omitted-variables and sample-selection concerns mean that
cautious interpretation is required; moreover, many studies use inappropriate
controls that themselves reflect discretionary police decisions. Some clever studies
exploit variation in decision-makers‟ access to race information, potentially providing
stronger causal identification, but these too have substantial limitations. Finally, lab
experiments demonstrating prevalent implicit racial bias support stronger causal
inferences, but do not tell us how these biases translate into real-world outcomes.
To supplement these tools, I propose a new approach: “auditing” the police
using paired testers of different races. Auditing is a staple of research on (and
enforcement of laws against) employment, housing, and lending discrimination. In
the policing context, the approach has not been tried, likely due to safety, ethical, and
legal concerns. I discuss ways to mitigate these concerns through careful research
design and cooperation with police departments or other government agencies.
Despite its challenges, this approach offers something that other methods generally
do not: the promise of strong causal identification in a real-world setting.
Part I describes raw racial gaps in U.S. police interactions and their relationship
to punishment disparities, and introduces normative questions surrounding their
empirical assessment. Part II examines how and why the relationship between
policing gaps and criminal conduct should be estimated. Part III examines the
estimation of police racial discrimination, and proposes the auditing method.
I. Stakes and Objectives
In this Part, I discuss what‟s at stake in efforts to quantify racial disparities in
policing. Section A describes the problem these efforts seek to explain: large race
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gaps in criminal justice involvement. I also show that without understanding policing
disparities, it is difficult to interpret disparities in later criminal process stages and in
incarceration. Section B outlines various possible objectives of empirical estimation.
A. Race and Criminal Justice
Let‟s begin with what we know: people of color, especially black men, are
involved in the U.S. criminal justice system at highly disproportionate rates. These
“raw” disparities have been the focus of some empirical work,4 some scholars‟ policy
arguments,5 and much media coverage.6 Herein, I use the term “disparity” to refer to
raw outcome gaps, not to any particular reason for those gaps, unless specified.
1. Disparities in Police Interactions
In 2011, the arrest rate for all black adults was approximately 10%; the rate for all
white adults was approximately 4%. 7 Rates are especially high for black men. 8
African-Americans on average are arrested on more serious charges: compared to
whites, nearly four times as often for violent crime, eight times for murder
specifically, four times for drug sales or manufacturing, and 4.5 times for weapons
offenses. 9 These figures (and the underlying data) don‟t differentiate by Hispanic
ethnicity; if African-Americans were compared to non-Hispanic whites, the gaps
would surely be larger.10 Because black-white disparities are particularly large, I use
them as the paradigmatic research target in this Article. Estimating other
demographic disparities poses the same basic challenges.
We lack national data on pre-arrest policing decisions, including traffic and
pedestrian stops, frisks, and searches.11 However, local studies have reported large
4 E.g., Michael R. Smith & Matthew Petrocelli, Racial Profiling? A Multivariate Analysis of Traffic Stop
Data, 4 POLICE Q. 4, 9-12 (2001); Jeff Rojek et al., The Influence of Driver‟s Race on Traffic Stops in Missouri,
7 POLICE Q. 126 (2004).
5 E.g., I. Bennet Cappers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizienship, and the Equality Principle,
46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2011); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law
of the Land, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010); Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in
the Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 721 (2004).
6 E.g., Jess Bidgood, Boston Police Focus on Blacks in Disproportionate Numbers, Study Shows, NEW YORK
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2014; see Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing,
in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 181 (2010) (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds.)
(describing “compulsion in media reports” to focus on these comparisons).
7 These rates come from the online arrest rate calculation tool from the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm#.
8 Id. The BJS data are not broken down by race and sex combined, but in general, men are more
than three times as likely to be arrested as women are.
9 Id.
10 Hispanic incarceration rates are nearly twice those of non-Hispanic whites, Leah Sakata, Breaking
Down Mass Incarceration in the U.S. Census, Prison Policy Initiative, May 28, 2014, so arrest rates are
presumably also higher. In the ethnically undifferentiated data, far more Hispanics are likely described
as “white” than as “black.” See U.S. Census Bureau Working Paper, America‟s Churning Races, 16 tbl. 1.
11 E.g., Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1129-30
(2013). See also Samuel R. Gross & Katherine R. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction
on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 678-82 (2002) (observing that police can fudge data, such as by
“ghosting,” reporting stops of white drivers that never occurred).
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gaps. For example, “Blacks were subjected to 63% of [police-pedestrian] encounters,
even though they made up just 24% of Boston‟s population.” 12 Police data fairly
consistently show that black and Hispanic drivers are disproportionately stopped and
searched.13 Data on use of force are limited, but fatalities are well documented. From
1976 to 1998, African-Americans were four times as likely as whites to be killed by
police.14 A new, federally funded initiative is developing a national Justice Database
covering stops and use of force.15
2. Incarceration Disparities and their Relationship to Policing
Raw disparities in U.S. incarceration rates are even larger. Black men are
incarcerated at six times the rate of non-Hispanic white men (and fifty times that of
white women); Hispanic men fall midway between. Because the U.S. has an
exceptionally high overall incarceration rate,16 these gaps translate into astonishing
total numbers. One in fifteen adult black men is currently behind bars, including one
in nine under age 35. 17 The lifetime incarceration hazard for black males is
approximately 1 in 3.18 When probation and parole figures are added, one-third of
black men under 35 are currently under criminal justice supervision.19
Researchers have generally attributed the majority of incarceration disparity to
arrest differences.20 So to understand the reasons for incarceration gaps, we need to
understand why there are such sharp racial differences in arrests. Without this
understanding, we also may know less than we think we know about disparities in
subsequent process stages, such as sentencing. Studies of later process stages use
samples consisting only of cases that made it into the criminal justice system and use
control variables (such as arrest offense or conviction offense) that are shaped by
police officers‟ earlier decisions. Police discrimination could introduce sample
selection bias and could distort the control variables as well.
To illustrate, assume that white and black crime patterns are identical, but that
police discriminate against blacks, such that other factors equal, police are more
likely to arrest black suspects, or to arrest them on more serious charges (for
example, describing an assault as “aggravated”). If so, the black arrestee pool for any
ACLU, “Black, Brown, and Targeted: A Report on Boston Police Department Street Encounters
from 2007-2010,” at 1 (2014), https://www.aclum.org/sites/all/files/images/education/
stopandfrisk/black_brown_and_targeted_online.pdf.
13 Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275-76 (2004).
14 Jodi M. Brown & Patrick A. Langan, Bur. Just. Statistics, Policing and Homicide, 1976-1998 (2001).
15 See Center for Policing Equity, Nation‟s First Police Profiling Database Awarded Grant By NSF, Nov. 7,
2013, http://cpe.psych.ucla.edu/images/uploads/database_release_final_%281%29.pdf.
16 E.g., Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht23prison.12253738.html?pagewanted=all.
17 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (Feb. 2008).
18 Bonczar, supra note 2, at 1.
19 Id. at 2.
20 See Brett E. Garland et al., Racial Disproportionality in the American Prison Population, 5 JUST. POL‟Y J.
1, 21-26 (2008) (reviewing studies); Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations
Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743 (1993) (finding that 76% of the black-white incarceration gap stems
from arrest patterns).
12
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given arrest offense will contain some weaker or less-serious cases that would not
have resulted in arrest on that charge were the arrestee white. If studies of
subsequent prosecutorial and judicial decisions do not account for this, they may
overlook substantial differences in the cases they are comparing. Controlling for the
arrest offense does not result in an apples-to-apples comparison if the arrest offense
means something different depending on race.21
Researchers have often ignored these problems; instead, they should
acknowledge them, and interpret their results cautiously in light of reasonable
assumptions guided by the policing literature.22 For example, if we can assume police
probably don‟t tend to discriminate against whites, then estimates of unexplained
disparities favoring whites in subsequent processes are likely conservative.
Researchers can also offer sensitivity analyses showing effects of competing
assumptions about arrest disparities. But the bounds implied by such analyses might
be wide, because the uncertainty about arrest disparities is great. To develop a clearer
empirical picture of later procedural stages, we need a better handle on policing.
3. Consequences of Criminal Justice Disparities
Data on raw disparities help us to understand who is bearing the burdens of our
expansive criminal justice system. These burdens include the social consequences of
mass incarceration 23 and the potentially lifelong legal and socioeconomic
consequences of having a criminal record.24 The harms of police interactions are not
confined to the guilty—most stops and searches produce no evidence of
wrongdoing.25 Even if no charges are brought, arrest records can produce stigma,
job-market consequences, and increased sentences in future cases.26 And even absent
arrest, interacting with police is often stressful and scary, and the experience of being
racially targeted can amplify the emotional and dignitary costs.27
When police use force, the impacts on individuals and communities can be
especially acute, as recent events, including the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric
Garner and their aftermath, have amply demonstrated. This Article does not focus
primarily on disparities in the use of force, which raise distinct normative concerns
The vast majority of sentence-disparity studies compound the problem by using samples of
sentenced cases and controlling for conviction or sentencing-stage severity measures, failing to account
for disparities in charging, plea-bargaining, and sentencing fact-finding. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit
Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker,
123 YALE L.J. 2, 39-77 (reviewing literature and explaining this problem).
22 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases, AM. L. & ECON. REV.
__ (2014) (forthcoming) (following this approach).
23 See, e.g, Garland et al., supra note 20, at 9-14 (reviewing literature).
24 See James Forman, Jr., Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U L. REV. 21, 28-32 (2012).
25 See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, in
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 49.
26 See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can
Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2014.
27 See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 212-13; Rod
Brunson, Beyond Stop Rates: Using Qualitative Methods to Examine Racially Biased Policing, in RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 224-33 (interviewing young black men in St. Louis).
21
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and have been hard to study due to lack of data. Rather, although some of the points
I make apply to use-of-force disparities, my primary focus (and that of the existing
policing-disparity literature) is on investigative interactions, such as stops, searches,
and arrests. These issues are, of course, entangled. One key reason those killed by
the police are predominantly black men is that black men are vastly more likely to be
stopped by the police in the first place, creating far more interactions that can go
terribly wrong. And fear of excessive force is one of the factors that can make a
“routine” police interaction not just inconvenient, but traumatic.
Of course, policing seeks to prevent crime, and crime damages communities too.
And some crimes (for example, homicide) are more commonly committed both by
and against people of color 28 —which is unsurprising in light of socioeconomic
stratification by race.29 If the police were to fail to arrest more members of groups
that commit more crimes, they might be fairly criticized for underserving communities
of color, especially because most crimes with victims are intraracial.30 Such a failure
could send an expressive message devaluing victims of color. Analogously, critics
have condemned victim-race disparities in capital sentencing for implying that “a
black life simply is worth less than a white life.”31
One might ask, then: do policing disparities harm or benefit the “over-policed”
group? In some contexts, the answer is clearly “harm,” because the harms are
concentrated on the group while the benefits are shared by everyone, or because it is
the innocent within the group, not the guilty, who face excessive policing. But in
other contexts, there are real tradeoffs between the community‟s interests in
reducing policing burdens and reducing crime, so the answer is less obvious.
These questions resist generalizable answers. Other bodies of empirical
scholarship have struggled with estimating the costs of crime and incarceration and
the effects of incarceration and policing on crime.32 The cost of stops, searches, and
arrests remain unquantified, as do the effects of community resentment of police.
These factors surely vary across groups and localities, and communities‟ perceptions
of what balance of benefits and burdens is appropriate may also vary. 33 Disparity
researchers typically do not seek to answer the “net benefits” question (nor do I);
they provide a different piece of the puzzle for policymakers.
28 Crime in the United States 2011, Expanded Homicide Data, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/offenses-known-to-lawenforcement/expanded/expanded-homicide-data (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).
29E.g., Patrick Bayer et al., Separate When Equal? Racial Inequality and Residential Segregation, 82 J. URBAN
ECON. 32, 32-33 (2014).
30 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19 (1997) (“The principal injury suffered
by African-Americans in criminal matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement….”); Dan
M. Kahan & Tracy L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1166 (1998);
Harris, supra note 25, at 49.
31 Christian Halliburton, Neither Separate Nor Equal, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR SOCIAL JUST. 45, 54 (2004).
32 See David S. Abrams, The Imprisoner‟s Dilemma: A Cost-Benefit Approach to Incarceration, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 905 (2013) (reviewing this literature).
33 Within many black communities that once pushed for aggressive law enforcement, public opinion
has also shifted over time. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
285-87 (2011); Forman, supra note 31, at 34-39.
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C. Conceptions and Causes of Disparity: Possible Research Objectives
Imagine that policing-disparity researchers could gather whatever data they
wanted. What would we prioritize doing with it? This kind of thought experiment is
often a valuable guide to empirical research. Here, the answer turns on questions
about what kinds of inequality matter.
Consider the following claims about what would constitute racial equality in a
city‟s law enforcement. For the purpose of this exercise and the rest of the Article‟s
hypotheticals, I assume that we are assessing stops. One could substitute other
outcomes, such as searches or arrests or downstream outcomes like incarceration,
without fundamentally changing the analysis.
1. The racial distribution of stops should track the racial distribution of the population.
2. The racial distribution of stops should track the racial distribution of crime commission.
3. A racial disparity in stop rates is only justified if it is proportional to a disparity in crime rates.
4. Holding criminal conduct constant, the probability that someone will be stopped should not
differ by race.
5. The police should not consider race when deciding whom to stop.
6. The police should consider race only when doing so improves their odds of catching criminals.
While some of these formulations sound fairly similar, they express different
ideas. Formulation (1) treats raw disparities as troubling inequalities, regardless of the
reason. Formulations (2) through (4) focus solely on disentangling the explanatory
role of crime (implicitly treating other explanations as unwarranted sources of
disparity). Of these, versions (2) and (3) are the most common conceptions of
equality tested by the empirical literature; such studies compare stop data to some
measure of crime across groups.34 In Part II, I argue that version (4) is a better way
to think about “accounting for crime,” and show that it‟s quite different from
versions (2) and (3). Version (4) could be teased out into separate sub-principles
requiring racial equality in policing of the innocent and in policing of the guilty.35
Formulations (5) and (6) are different in kind. They focus on decision-making
inputs, not on outcome gaps and their crime justifications. Testing them requires
filtering out a broader range of factors (not just crime), to isolate some variety of
racial discrimination (a term I use here in its narrow, “disparate treatment” sense).
Formulation (5) treats all police uses of race as suspect, while Formulation (6)
reflects a recently prominent approach distinguishing between “irrational” prejudice
and “rational” use of empirical information.
Many other nuances are possible. When disparity researchers specify an empirical
model, they make many decisions about what sources of disparity “count.” For
See infra Part II (reviewing this literature).
A few scholars have called for separate analysis of disparities among the innocent and guilty.
David
Thacher,
From
Racial
Profiling
to
Racial
Equality,
unpublished,
8
http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/page.jsp?paperid=1092784&searchTerm=commission+for+racial;
R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169
(2006); Jeff Dominitz, How Do the Laws of Probability Constrain Legislative and Judicial Efforts to Stop Racial
Profiling?, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 412, 414 (2003). In Part II, I assess how this can be done effectively.
34
35
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example, should researchers control for the neighborhood? Some argue that one
shouldn‟t: excessive targeting of minority neighborhoods is a potentially important
source of unjustified disparity, not something that should be filtered out. 36 The
counterargument is that intra-neighborhood disparities—albeit not the whole story—
are also important.37 Filtering out neighborhood effects allows those disparities to be
studied in a causally rigorous way, because neighborhoods differ in many ways that
could confound analyses of race‟s effects.
A reader might reasonably object that most empirical papers frame their
objectives as descriptive. To describe racial disparities as being explained in part by
some variable does not necessarily imply that the part mediated by that variable is
normatively justified. For example, I may want to disentangle the effects of racial
discrimination from those of socioeconomic discrimination even if I believe both are
troubling. Empiricists need not specify which explanations are “bad” and which are
“good”—they need merely decide which ones are worth disentangling.
This is a fair objection, but it only goes so far. First, many studies do explicitly
offer estimates of “unwarranted” disparities. Second, empiricists studying race and
policing cannot be blind to the context in which their work will be received. The
subject matter is high-profile and emotionally and politically charged. Statistics are
cited often by virtually everyone in the relevant policy and legal discussions. And
those citing statistics clearly do not think of them as being normatively neutral. So
when a study reports a bottom-line number that it characterizes as the “racial
disparity holding other factors constant,” for example, that will be read by most
readers as “the unjustified racial disparity.” That means researchers should think
carefully about what other factors they hold constant.
Just as importantly, authors in that situation should clearly explain their choices
and why they made them, what their estimates represent, and what they don‟t
represent. They should not bury these issues deep in the methods section—they
should be front and center. Choices like what control variables are included are not
technicalities; they define what the study is measuring. Moreover, if researchers aim
to tease out the roles of several different factors in producing disparities, they should
present results in a way that highlights those roles, rather than just highlighting the
disparity that is left over once identified factors are filtered out.38
Instead, the empirical literature is largely either quiet or confusing on questions
like these. Some studies use methods that do not mask the task they purport to
address—for example, stating a concern with “racial profiling,” but employing
analyses that focus only on ruling out crime differences.39 Scholars also sometimes
See Fagan et al., supra note 116, at 316.
Indeed, unwarranted intra-neighborhood disparities may raise especially acute fairness concerns:
they burden one racial group while neighbors of all races enjoy the crime-prevention benefits. In
contrast, extra policing of a neighborhood confers both benefits and burdens on that neighborhood.
38 Various decomposition methods from labor economics are designed for this purpose, but are
rarely used in the criminal justice literature. See, e.g., Starr, supra, at 14 tbl.4.
39 E.g., James E. Lange et al., Testing the Racial Profiling Hypothesis for Seemingly Disparate Stops on the New
Jersey Turnpike, 22 JUSTICE Q. 193, 194-95 (2005). Some also cite raw disparities as evidence of racial
profiling. E.g., Cappers, supra note 5, at 14-19; Johnson, supra note 5, at 1073.
36
37
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mischaracterize one another‟s arguments because of confusion about these framing
issues—for instance, mistaking the choice to estimate a particular type of disparity
for an empirical claim that only that type of disparity exists.40
In Parts II and III, I seek to clarify the relationships among different objectives,
to discuss what the “right” questions are, and to examine ways of answering them.
Part II focuses on the relationship between policing disparities and crime, and Part
III focuses on analysis of police decision-making, especially the role of racial
discrimination. In highlighting these questions, I do not mean to devalue the
importance of measuring raw disparities (version 1). But the raw disparity picture is
already relatively clear, so I do not focus on it, instead focusing on why the gaps exist.
II. Policing Disparities and Crime
In analyses of the “why” question, the usual starting point is crime. Indeed, it‟s
also often the ending point: many analyses assess only whether crime differences can
explain policing gaps. This Part examines how crime‟s explanatory role should be
analyzed. I begin with the question of how to measure crime, and then ask whether
crime “benchmarks” are being deployed in normatively meaningful ways, even
assuming their accuracy. I show that the ubiquitous types of policing-to-crime
comparisons do not mean what people imply when they use them. They do not tell
us whether people with like conduct are being treated the same way.
A. Crime Benchmarks and the “Denominator Problem”
The search for crime “benchmarks” has long been seen as the key empirical
challenge of policing-disparity research.41 Indeed, the problem of unmeasured crime
bedevils essentially all empirical research related to crime.42 Many police forces have
started collecting better data on whom the police are stopping, searching, and
arresting. But without data on criminal conduct, we have nothing to compare this to.
We have what many call a “denominator problem.”43
The problem is really twofold. First, criminal justice datasets include no
information about cases that never enter the justice system—that is, the vast majority
For example, Pickerill et al. claim that legal scholars who focus on racially disparate treatment
assume “race is the sole factor that causes police to search motorists. J. Mitchell Pickerill et al., Search
and Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A Disparate Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL‟Y 1, 2 (2009)
Engel likewise claims that “the legalistic perspective” assumes away racial differences in crime rates
and assumes racial profiling is always ineffective. Robin S. Engel, A Critique of the „Outcome Test‟ in
Racial Profiling Research, 25 JUSTICE Q. 1, 5-9 (2012). Both claim that such legal scholars believe raw
disparities are never normatively justified. Id. at 9; Pickerill et al. supra, at 5. But such claims are not
common in legal literature, and none are “legalistic”; the law makes it hard to infer discrimination
from disparity. It is perfectly consistent to critique disparate treatment while recognizing that other
factors also contribute to disparities. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 150-51.
41 E.g., Robin Shepard Engel & Jennifer M. Calnon, Comparing Benchmark Methodologies for Police-Citizen
Contacts, 7 POLICE QUARTERLY 97, 98, 100 (2004); Ridgeway, supra, at 19.
42 See, e.g., Albert D. Biderman & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., On Exploring the „Dark Figure‟ of Crime, 374
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POLIT. & SOCIAL SCIENCE 1, 1 (1976).
43 E.g., Meaghan Paulhaumas et al., State of the Science in Racial Profiling Research, in RACE, ETHNICITY,
AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 239.
40
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of crimes. For example, surveys suggest there are at least hundreds of millions of
drug crimes per year, but only about 1.5 million drug arrests.44 Even most reported
violent and property crimes go unsolved.45 Second, even for those who do interact
with police, we lack objective conduct measures. Rather, we have what officers write
down, and in a study of policing disparity, one shouldn‟t assume this is accurate.
This situation is not really a data collection failure, however: nobody thinks the
data in question ought to be collected comprehensively. The value that society places
on freedom from constant surveillance requires that the vast majority of crimes go
uncounted (not to mention unpunished). So researchers must rely on imperfect,
incomplete proxies. But what makes a good proxy?
Some scholars use arrest rates, often from a prior time period, to stand in for
crime rates. But this introduces a troubling circularity: arrests are discretionary
decisions by the very actors whose stops are being studied. What is really being asked
is thus not “Does crime explain stop disparities?” but “Are stop disparities bigger
than arrest disparities?” Arguably, arrest benchmarks might sometimes be defensible
as deliberately conservative,46 but they should generally be avoided.
Reported crime is a better alternative, but is still imperfect. Crime reports are
collected by local agencies and compiled by the FBI.47 The principal problem is that
most crime goes unreported—about half of violent crimes and 60% of property
crimes, according to victim surveys. 48 Moreover, minor and victimless crimes are
See Office of Nat‟l Drug Control Pol‟y, Fact Sheet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/ nsduh_fact_sheet_9-7-11_0.pdf (about 23 million Americans
use illicit drugs each month).
For arrest rates, see the online calculation tool at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfm#. See also Impaired Driving, CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv_factsheet.html (finding 1%
arrested out of 112 million self-reported drunk-driving instances).
45 Nationally, under 20% of reported property crimes and 45% of reported violent crimes are
cleared. Crime in the United States 2012, Clearances, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crimein-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/clearances.
46 For instance, Fagan et al., supra note 116, at 318-19, and Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the
NYPD‟s Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 813, 818-20
(2012), find disparities in stop-and-frisk rates after controlling for prior-year arrests. Their estimates
are likely conservative, assuming arrest and stop disparities cut in the same direction.
47 The FBI‟s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) provide summary data for certain crimes, but have no
race information except for homicides. Crime in the United States 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement.
Some agencies participate in the National Incident-Based Reporting System, which includes suspect
race. U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, FBI, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM: DATA
COLLECTION GUIDELINES (2000), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/nibrs/manuals/v1all.pdf. Some studies
use crime-report data from local sources. E.g., Howard P. Greenwald, Final Report: Vehicle Stops in
Sacramento, California, Report to the City of Sacramento (2001); Ridgeway, supra, at 13.
48 Jennifer L. Truman, Criminal Victimization, 2010, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin, September
2011, 1, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv10.pdf. Garland et al., supra, at 19-20, respond that
reported crime is the right comparison point because “the criminal justice process does not begin until
the police become aware of a crime,” so police are not responsible for reporting disparities. But much
policing is proactive, not report-driven. See Ridgeway, supra, at 18 (finding 30% of NYPD stops
responded to citizen calls). Regardless, here, we are assessing whether policing burdens are fairly
distributed conditional on criminal conduct, not whether to blame police for any maldistribution.
44
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almost never reported,49 so reported-crime benchmarks are usually based on “index
crimes,” 50 violent crimes, or even just homicide. 51 But if stop or arrest rates are
driven heavily by drugs or minor crimes, comparing them to such benchmarks may
introduce bias. Racial differences in crime rates are believed to be far greater for
violent crime, especially homicide.52 So using violent-crime benchmarks to proxy for
all crime risks substantially overstating the extent to which disparities in stops or
arrests are explained by differences in criminal conduct.
Another alternative is survey data. Some surveys, such as the Census Bureau‟s
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), gather data about crimes with
victims.53 Other surveys ask individuals to self-report drug use. These generally show
only minor racial differences in drug use,54 findings that scholars often contrast with
large race gaps in drug arrest rates.55 Survey benchmarks avoid some of the concerns
raised above: they cover crimes not reported to police, are not themselves shaped by
police, and encompass a wider variety of crimes. But there remain concerns about
accuracy. 56 Also, national surveys‟ samples are not designed to produce valid local
estimates.57 And most drug surveys cover only use, not supply.58

49 Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in
the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 317 (1997).
50 The eight crimes used in the Uniform Crime Reports “index”: murder, forcible rape, arson,
larceny, robbery, burglary, car theft, and aggravated assault.
51 E.g., Fagan et al., supra note 116, at 318-19 (using homicide); Greg Ridgeway, Analysis of Racial
Disparities in the New York Police Department‟s Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices, RAND Corp. Rep‟t TR534 xii, 19, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR534.html (using violent crime). Again,
this choice might be defensible as conservative: Fagan et al. find disparities despite using the homicide
benchmark, which is striking given the likely downward-biasing effect. But it is clearly inappropriate
to use violent-crime benchmarks to show lack of disparity, as Ridgeway does.
52 Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota‟s Prison and Jail
Populations, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 238 (2009).
53 For the questionnaire, see http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvs2_2012.pdf. See Shima
Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 201 (2013) (citing the NCVS).
54 Monitoring
the Future I, 9, http://monitoringthefuture.org//pubs/monographs/mtfvol1_2013.pdf; Dep‟t Health & Hum. Servs., Results from the 2013 Nat‟l Survey of Drug Use and Health 26,
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHresultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHr
esults2013.pdf.
55 E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 6-7; Yonette F. Thomas, The Social Epidemiology
of Drug Abuse, 32 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. S141 (2007); see also Gross & Barnes, supra note 11, at
681 (comparing survey data to traffic stop rates); Christopher L. Griffin, Jr. et. al., Corrections for Racial
Disparities in Law Enforcement, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1365, 1381-82 (2014) (using surveys on DWIs).
56 See Barry Spunt, Self-Report Surveys, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1465, 146667 (David Levinson ed.) (2002); Arthur H. Garrison, Disproportionate Minority Arrest, 23 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 42-45 (1997).
57 Brian Wiersema, Area-Identified National Crime Victimization Survey Data, NCVOR Census Ctr. Tech.
Paper 1 (1999), http://www.ncovr.heinz.cmu.edu/docs/Wiersema-Area-Identified%20NCVS.pdf;
Dep‟t Health and Human Servs., Substance Abuse and Mental Health Admin., State Estimates of
Substance Abuse from the 2006-07 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health 7-9 (2009).
58 One survey that did ask questions about drug sales found somewhat higher rates among blacks,
albeit not high enough to explain the arrest gap. See Frase, supra note 52, at 239.
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Given existing datasets‟ limits, some researchers have gathered new data by
physically observing public behavior—usually traffic violations. The seminal example
was John Lamberth‟s 1994 study of the New Jersey Turnpike, in which researchers
drove just over the speed limit and observed the drivers who passed them; the racial
composition of speeders was compared to Turnpike stop data.59 Subsequent highway
speeding studies have used radar.60 Alpert et al. similarly physically observed traffic
violations on city streets. 61 Outside the traffic context, Dabney et al. used video
cameras in a store to observe shoplifting—an innovative method, though the study‟s
analysis is unfortunately hard to interpret. 62 The study also illustrates a key concern
with benchmarking generally: the appropriateness of comparing behavioral and
policing-outcome data from different sources. The authors compare shoplifting
apprehension figures from a national study to shoplifting rates at a single store,
which could be atypical. The highway-speeding studies do better on this score,
comparing observed behavior with stop data from the same highways.
The direct-observation method has promise for behaviors (like traffic offenses)
occurring in predictable, public locations where researchers or recording devices can
be stationed. It could usefully be applied to law enforcement checkpoints, which
could record agents‟ behavior and that of individuals passing through, plus any
computer-database information that agents observe. This approach could go beyond
traditional benchmarking, measuring individuals‟ behavior and agents‟ treatment for
the same sample, instead of comparing across different datasets.63 But most policing
contexts are not a good fit for direct observation—most crime occurs in private or
unpredictable places. For such conduct, the best available benchmark probably
remains victim reports or survey data, despite these sources‟ limitations.
B. Criminal Conduct as a Possible Justification for Policing Disparities
Once one has settled on a crime benchmark, what should one do with it? To
answer this question, we need to ask why so much research focuses on whether
crime explains policing disparities to the exclusion of other possible explanations.
John Lamberth, Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of Police Stops and Arrests of Black
Drivers/Travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike Between Exits or Interchanges 1 and 3 from the Years 1998 through
1991, Nov. 11, 1994. Fifteen percent of speeders and 35% of those stopped were black.
60 See Lange et al., supra note 39, at 211-12; Robin S. Engel et al., Pennsylvania State Police Project
on Police-Citizen Contacts, Year 2 Report 64-65, 110 (2002)
61 Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Investigating Racial Profiling by the Miami-Dade Police Department, 6
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL‟Y 25, 36, 41-44 (2007) (finding no unjustified racial disparity in stops).
62 The authors find no racial disparities in shoplifting after controlling for shopper behaviors such as
product-tampering, but these controls seem to filter out part of the shoplifting conduct itself. Dean A.
Dabney et al., Who Actually Steals? A Study of Covertly Observed Shoplifters, 21 JUST. Q. 693, 711 (2004).
63 Federal agencies have already conducted self-studies designed to produce racial benchmarks
for comparisons to checkpoint stops. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Assessing Measurement Techniques
for
Identifying
Race,
Ethnicity,
and
Gender
N.C.J.
Report
196855,
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ascii/amtireg.txt (2003). However, these studies merely recorded
the race of those passing through, plus (in an airport security study) some additional information such
as gender, age, and number of carry-ons. This could easily be extended to record agent responses,
individual behavior, and computer-system information.
59
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One possibility is crime‟s descriptive importance. Many scholars have argued that
crime differences are the single most important explanation for race gaps in U.S.
arrest and incarceration rates. 64 But this does not really explain why so many
analyses focus on crime exclusively. Some policing-to-crime comparisons (such as
the common comparison of drug arrest rates to use rates) do not actually find that
crime substantially explains policing disparities. And even when it does, other
factors may also be important. Indeed, when other contributors to disparity are
layered on top of substantial crime differences, it amplifies their consequences.65 In
any event, crime-disproportionality analyses are not designed to support strong
causal inferences. They tell us whether policing rates are in line with what we would
expect based on crime patterns, not why they are or are not.66
But there is another reason for the focus on crime. Many researchers and
commentators appear to treat crime differences as potential justifications for disparities
in police interactions, not just explanations. Meanwhile, policing disparities that are
disproportionate to crime differences are presented, explicitly or by implication, as
unjustified. The crime-disproportionality question seems to get at many people‟s core
intuitions about what makes racial disparities in the justice system not just
unfortunate, but unfair. So what underlies these intuitions?
Start with an oft-repeated principle: like cases should be treated alike. The limits
of this principle have been much debated,67 but it is clearly a widely shared intuition,
at least as a default rule.68 A sensible way of understanding the literature‟s emphasis
on crime benchmarks is that criminality is what determines which cases are
meaningfully “like.” If so, when we say policing should be “proportionate” to crime,
we imply a specific objective: equal policing of people of different racial groups conditional on
their criminal conduct. Assuming a simplified binary guilty/innocent division, this
objective requires that (1) the probability that an innocent person will be stopped
does not vary by race, and (2) the probability that a guilty person will be stopped
does not vary by race. We can express these objectives as follows:
( )

⁄
⁄

, and ( )

⁄
⁄

E.g., KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 23, TONRY, supra note 73, at 79; Forman, supra note 31, at 31-32.
For example, suppose crime could explain the vast majority of the 6-to-1 black-white
incarceration gap, i.e., whites were only 10% less likely to be incarcerated than blacks with the same
criminal conduct. Even then, that gap would be consequential: reducing black incarceration by 10%
would mean restoring the liberty of more than 1% of all black men under 35 in the United States (1 in
9 of whom are now in prison). See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal
Sentences, 122 J. POLIT. ECON. 1320, 1349-50 (2014) (making a similar calculation).
66
For instance, policing patterns that are unexplained by crime might result from racial
discrimination, or from applying race-neutral criteria that are differentially accurate across races.
67 E.g., David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike?, U. Chi. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working
Paper No. 24, at 3 (2002); Kenneth Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974).
68 See Strauss, supra, at 3 (arguing, however, that there are often good reasons to depart from it).
64
65
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S stands for “stops” and P for “population,” subscripts I and G stand for “innocent”
and “guilty,” and subscripts 1 and 2 identify the two racial groups being compared.
DI and DG are ratios of the groups‟ stop rates among the innocent and guilty,
respectively. One can easily complicate proposition (2) to accommodate many
varieties of criminality; the objective remains that those with the same culpability
should face the same probability of apprehension.
Why does criminal behavior determine “likeness”? One strong argument is based
on moral desert. Policing is not punishment, but it facilitates it, so if we think
criminals deserve punishment, we should want them to face police stops, searches,
and arrests; we should also want the innocent to avoid such interactions. The police
lack perfect information, so they cannot stop every criminal and will stop some
innocents. But if the probability of these errors varies by race, there is racial
inequality unjustified by criminal conduct.69
Two clarifications are important here. First, I am not suggesting that the highercrime group as a whole deserves heavier policing. The concept of “group desert” finds
no support in retributive precepts,70 and affixing blame to an entire race would be
particularly repugnant. Nonetheless, targeting of guilty individuals can in the aggregate
produce group outcome differences. Second, I exclude use of force from the
discussion of whether crime differences “justify” policing disparities. I do not think
that criminal culpability means that one deserves to be subjected to physical violence
by police. Use of force may occasionally be justified based on different kinds of
moral considerations, focused on imminent risk. But such situations cannot be
identified using crime benchmark data.
An alternative to the retributive rationale for treating crime as a special
justification is to focus on the rule of law. The “like cases” principle is often
described as a rule-of-law value: it “entails and is entailed by conformity to law.”71 If
so, then law determines what cases are “like”—in the policing context, criminal law
specifically. This argument focuses more on preventing arbitrary decision-making
than on outcome fairness, but still implies that policing rates should be equal across
racial groups conditional on criminal conduct.72
Note that one can embrace this objective without thinking that we shouldn‟t
worry about disparities that are explained by criminal conduct. But in that case, the
worry wouldn‟t be that policing is misaligned with what it‟s supposed to target.
See Thacher, supra note 35, at 2 (arguing for goal of “racial equality within morally homogeneous
groups”).
70 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1369 (2003); Joshua Dressler,
Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 103-08 (1985).
71 Winston, supra, at 5.
72 A counterargument is that perhaps what should determine “likeness” is behavior outwardly signaling
likely criminality, legally justifying a stop. This would be inconsistent with the moral desert objective,
but one could defend it from the rule-of-law perspective. We lack data on underlying suspiciousness,
however, and it is a readily manipulable characterization. The problems I identify below with policingto-crime comparisons assume that actual criminality is the intended measure of “likeness.” If
suspiciousness were the right measure and if crime is a poor proxy for it, that would raise additional
problems for policing-to-crime comparisons, since they have the wrong comparison point entirely.
69
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Instead, it might focus our attention on root causes of crime differences (for
example, educational inequities and poverty), or else on the overall scope and
severity of our criminal law and its enforcement, given its disparate impact.73 Those
who present policing-to-crime comparisons do not necessarily imply that these other
types of inequality don‟t matter, but they do imply that inequality in police
interactions among people who have done the same thing is a distinct fairness
problem that merits empirical measurement and policy concern.
Richard Banks, Jennifer Eberhardt, and Lee Ross have called for separate
attention to disparities in policing of the guilty and of the innocent, respectively. This
call is persuasive: stops, searches, and arrests of the innocent are different kinds of
events from the same treatment of the guilty, and affect communities differently.
The authors go farther, however, asserting that when offending rates differ, “one
cannot attain equality across groups with respect to both the investigation of the
innocent and the apprehension of the guilty.”74 They claim:
If the crime rate is higher among Blacks than Whites, but the rates of investigation
are the same, then an African American criminal will be less likely to be apprehended
than a white criminal. To equalize across groups the likelihood that a criminal will be
apprehended would require increasing stop-search rates among Blacks, which would
have the unfortunate consequence of also increasing the likelihood that innocent
Blacks are investigated…. Either innocent members of the higher crime rate group
will be subject to a greater likelihood of investigation, or a greater percentage of
criminals from the higher crime rate group will be permitted to stay at large.75

This dilemma sounds daunting, and indeed, tradeoffs like this can sometimes
emerge in practice, and are worth highlighting. But the authors‟ claim is much too
strong. It is certainly possible to simultaneously equalize across races stop
probabilities for both the innocent and the guilty, even with very different crime
rates. For instance, randomized enforcement, such as at some DUI checkpoints,
would always satisfy both requirements. As another example, suppose police stop
suspected drunk drivers if and only if those drivers swerve. Suppose that regardless
of race, 60% of drunk drivers swerve and 10% of sober drivers swerve. The raceneutral swerving criterion means that 60% of drunk drivers get stopped and 10% of
sober drivers get stopped, regardless of race, whatever each racial group‟s drunkdriving rate is. Stop productivity (the percentage of stops that catch drunks, which is
not the same as the percentage of drunks who get stopped) will be higher for
whichever group has a higher drunk-driving rate. But this is troubling only if equal
productivity is an important metric of equality. As I argue below, it isn‟t. 76 Many
other examples are given in the next Section and the appendix.
73 See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 7980, 105 (1995); Kenneth B. Nunn, The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1487-89 (2000).
74 Banks et al., supra note 35, at 1178-79.
75 Id. at 1179.
76 Banks et al. also seem to conflate the question whether black and white criminals face the same
rate of apprehension with the question whether the police leave “more Black criminals than White
criminals at large as a proportion of the group‟s population.” Id. at 1179. Equalizing the prevalence of
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So there is nothing necessarily incompatible about racial equality in policing of
both the guilty and the innocent—and if we want to assess whether criminal conduct
“justifies” policing differences, we should ask whether those objectives are being
achieved. Unfortunately, as I show below, the literature comparing policing rates to
crime rates has overwhelmingly failed to ask that question.
C. Disproportionality Ratios: Are We Asking the Right Questions?
When researchers and commentators ask whether policing is “proportional” to
crime, what proportion are they referring to? Two comparison types are widespread.
I show here that neither is consistent with the “treat like cases alike” objective.
Again, my hypotheticals use “stops” as the policing outcome of interest, but others
could substitute; many examples that I cite from the literature focus on arrests.
First, many analyses ask: Is the ratio of police interactions for two groups
different from the ratio of crimes? For example, Prof. Michael Tonry writes that for
adult men, the ratio of black to white self-reported violent crimes is “4:1, which is
„very similar to differences observed in the Uniform Crime Reports of arrests for violent
offenses at this age,‟ unlike the adolescent years when the self-report ratio is 1.5:1
and the arrest ratio is 4:1.” 77 His implication is that among adults, the arrest gap is
explained by offending differences, but among adolescents, it‟s not.
The implied conception of inequality is sometimes formally expressed by
dividing the ratio of stop rates by the ratio of crime rates. 78 I label this “Stop
Ratio/Crime Ratio” or “Ratio/Ratio” disproportionality:
Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio =

⁄
⁄

=

⁄
⁄

For racial groups 1 and 2, S is the number of stops and PG is the number of criminals
(or crimes79). These comparisons are sometimes framed in terms of rates of stops and
criminals-at-large is not the same as equalizing apprehension rates conditional on criminality. The
former is an appealing aspiration, but may be unachievable via policing alone if underlying crime rates
are quite different, unless crime rates are highly elastic. Even if it could be done, it might require a
police presence that communities would find intolerable—and would likely require one group to have
a much higher apprehension rate for both the innocent and the guilty than the other group has.
Realistically, policing can‟t cancel out the many social and historical causes of crime-rate differences.
77 TONRY, supra note 73, at 78-79. For similar examples, see Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
& Leadership Conference Education Fund, Justice On Trial: Racial Disparities in the American Criminal
Justice System (2000), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/justice-on-trial/juvenile.html (citing the
same ratios as Tonry‟s concerning adolescents); Baradaran, supra note 53, at 201-02 (pointing to
relatively similar ratios as evidence of lack of substantial unjustified disparity); American Civil
Liberties Union, Blacks Found to Be 3.3 Times More Likely to Be Arrested for Marijuana Possession Than
Whites in Michigan, Despite Equal Usage Rates (Jun. 4, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/criminal-lawreform/blacks-found-be-33-times-more-likely-be-arrested-marijuana-possession-whites (pointing to
different arrest and crime ratios as evidence of unjustified disparity); Maia Szalavitz, Study: Whites More
Likely to Abuse Drugs Than Blacks, TIME, Nov. 7, 2011 (same); Halliburton, supra, at 55 (same); Griffin,
supra, at 1381-82 (comparing arrest and self-report rates for DWI).
78 See, e.g., Robert D. Crutchfield, Warranted Disparity? Questioning the Justification of Racial Disparity in
Criminal Justice Processing, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 30 tbl. 2 (2004).
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crimes, but it is equivalent to use total numbers instead; the “per capita” parts of
each rate term cancel. 80 The implication is that when crime differences explain
policing disparities, the stop ratio equals the crime ratio (so the Ratio/Ratio measure
is 1). “Guilt” and “innocence” are generally presented as binary, but one could
extend the concept to more complex scenarios.81
The other common framing compares a group‟s share of total stops to its share
of total crime. I refer to this as “Stop Share/Crime Share” or “Share/Share”
disproportionality. For example, the debate over stops on the New Jersey Turnpike
has revolved around these comparisons, beginning with Lamberth‟s finding that the
black stop share was 35% while the black share of speeders was 15%. On the other
side, prominent commentator Heather MacDonald cites a finding that 25% of the
drivers going 80mph in a 65mph zone were black; she then states: “Blacks are
actually stopped less than their speeding behavior would predict—they are 23
percent of those stopped.”82 Similarly, a RAND Corporation study of NYPD‟s stopand-frisk policy (cited heavily by the NYPD) concludes that “blacks are substantially
understopped” because they constitute 53% of all stops but 69% of violent-crime
suspect descriptions.83 Other examples abound.84
These comparisons imply that racially equitable policing should result in a racial
distribution of stops that parallels the racial distribution of crime. So if a group‟s
stop share is bigger than its crime share, it is overpoliced relative to other groups,
after accounting for crime; if the stop share is smaller, it is underpoliced; if they are
The denominator here refers to guilty people, which tracks some prominent studies—for example,
those that count speeding drivers. Alternatively, one could use number of crimes in a given period. For
this purpose, these approaches are conceptually equivalent: the ratio of total crimes in a period should
equal the average ratio of people committing a crime at all moments during that period.
80 See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 53, at 201-02 (using raw numbers instead). Using raw numbers
changes the stop ratio and the crime ratio, but in the same proportion, making the ratio-of-ratios
equivalent. If the stops and crime data come from different samples with different racial
compositions, however, the rates on the left must first be calculated within each sample.
81 For example, one could imagine a denominator combining various crime frequencies into some
severity-weighted measure, or calculate separate ratios for each crime condition.
82 Heather Mac Donald, The Racial Profiling Myth Debunked, CITY JOURNAL (2002), http://www.cityjournal.org/html/12_2_the_racial_profiling.html.
83 Ridgeway, supra, at 19.
84 E.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing another NYPD
share/share comparison); REBECCA M. BLANK ET AL., MEASURING DISCRIMINATION 193 (2004)
(comparing 18% black speeding share to 73% search share); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF
CRIME 35 (1998) (comparing 38% black crack-user share to 85% conviction share); Robert J.
Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United
States, 21 CRIME & JUSTICE 311, 328 (1997) (comparing 56% black robbery suspect share to 61%
arrest share); Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence Why It May Prove the Best First Step in
Curbing Repeat Abuse, 10 CRIM. JUST. 2, 52 (1995) (comparing shares of domestic violence reports and
arrests); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998) (comparing
speeding and stop shares); Lange et al, supra note 39, at 211; Stacey Patton, If You're White, That Joint
Probably Won't Lead to Jail Time, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2014 (comparing 14% black drug-user share to
34% drug-arrest and 53% drug-incarceration shares); Heather MacDonald, How to Increase the Crime
Rate Nationwide, WALL STREET J., June 12, 2013, A17 (“Blacks, at 55% of all police-stop subjects in
2012, are actually understopped compared with their 66% representation among violent criminals.”).
79

18
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2015

19

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 110 [2015]

STARR, EXPLAINING RACE GAPS IN POLICING

about equal, there is no unjustified racial disparity. In the empirical literature, such
comparisons are often formalized as another kind of disproportionality ratio:
Stop Share/Crime Share =

⁄
⁄

S1 and PG1 represent stops and criminals (or crimes) in Group 1 and S and PG
represent stops and criminals (or crimes) in the whole population.85
These two disproportionality measures are not the same. The Ratio/Ratio
measure compares two groups; the Share/Share measure compares one group to
everybody. One obvious distinction is that “everybody” may include more than two
groups. But even assuming a two-group world, the comparisons differ, because the
Share/Share approach compares Group 1 to the whole population including itself,
while the Ratio/Ratio measure compares it to Group 2 only. The measures always
cut in the same direction, but the Share/Share measure is always closer to 1; it is
“diluted” because it is partially a self-comparison.86 Another difference (illustrated in
the Appendix) is that the Share/Share measure depends on the groups‟ sizes.
More importantly, neither the Ratio/Ratio comparison nor the Share/Share
comparison tests whether there are racial disparities in policing of people with the
same criminal conduct. These comparisons can easily be misinterpreted as answers
to that question (indeed, they certainly seem intended to answer it), but this
interpretation is misleading. I illustrate this point here with just two examples. The
Appendix provides many more, plus proofs of the key propositions.
The core problem can be explained fairly simply. Suppose two racial groups have
different crime rates, and neither the probability of an innocent being stopped nor
that of a criminal being stopped varies by race. Should we expect the racial
distribution of stops to parallel the distribution of crimes? Our intuitions may say
yes, but the answer is no—not unless only criminals are stopped.87 When we include
the innocent in the numerators of all the ratios (the stop terms) but not the
denominators (the crime terms), the comparisons don‟t work. The effect of this
E.g., Engel et al., supra note 60, at 104-09 (calculating traffic stop share/speeding share ratios for
each of 27 Pennsylvania counties.); see Engel, supra note 40, at 9 (describing wide use of this method).
86 See Appendix, Proof 2.
87 Although this problem has been widely overlooked, the district court in the recent Floyd stop-andfrisk litigation in effect identified an extreme example of it, saying that comparisons to crime shares
were irrelevant because almost all those stopped were innocent. 959 F.Supp.2d at 584-85. The court
held that the better benchmark was each racial group‟s overall population (within neighborhoods), not
its guilty population. Id. (It relied on analyses that included other controls as well.) Note, however,
that this is alternative will usually raise the opposite problem—not “accounting for crime” at all,
instead of overcorrecting. We would only expect the distribution of stops to mirror the population
distribution if the police stop people at random. That may have been nearly true in Floyd; only 2% of
those stopped had any kind of contraband, which the plaintiffs argued made it essentially like a
random stop. Floyd v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034, Report of Jeffrey Fagan 63-65. Still, in most
contexts, stop rates are surely at least somewhat higher for the guilty than the innocent. In the next
Section, I discuss alternative methods that neither assume that everyone stopped is guilty nor that
those stopped are a random subset of their racial groups.
85
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numerator/denominator mismatch cuts in a specific direction: it inflates the stopcrime ratio more for the lower-crime group than for the higher-crime group. So it
looks like the lower-crime group is relatively overstopped after “accounting for
crime,” even though this hypothetical assumes equitable policing.
In practice, it‟s rarely only criminals who are stopped, searched, or arrested, even
if the police never overreach their authority—the law doesn‟t expect perfect accuracy
in policing. Indeed, we can expect many police interactions with the innocent even
when police are quite good at predicting guilt. That‟s because in most contexts, the
innocent far outnumber the guilty. For example, if stop rates among the guilty are 20
times those among the innocent, but there are 20 times as many innocent people,
half of those stopped will be innocent.
Let‟s work through two examples. Both assume a simple world with two racial
groups (black and white) and two criminal conduct conditions (innocent and guilty).
I also assume the premise of defenders of policing disparities is correct: black crime
rates are higher. I‟ll show that it‟s precisely when crime-rate disparities are large that
Share/Share and Ratio/Ratio comparisons are most misleading.
The first example assumes racially equitable policing conditional on criminal
conduct. Suppose the police, looking for weapons, stop pedestrians if and only if
they appear to have objects in their jacket pockets. Assume that regardless of race,
50% of weapons-carriers (“guilty”) and 25% of non-carriers (“innocent”) have
bulging pockets and are stopped—but black pedestrians are twice as likely to have
weapons (40% versus 20%). Table 1a gives the expected breakdown of stops if the
police encounter 100 black and 100 white pedestrians, and Table 1b calculates the
Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures.
Table 1a. Example Assuming Racial Equality Conditional on Conduct
Both Races: Assume Innocent Stop Rate = 25%, Guilty Stop Rate = 50%
P: 100 Black, 100
Innocents Innocent Stops Guilty Guilty Stops
White
[PI]
[SI= PI * 0.25]
[PG]
[SG= PG* 0.5]

Total Stops
[S=SI + SG]

Black (40% Guilty)

60

15

40

20

35

White (20% Guilty)

80

20

20

10

30

Table 1b. Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share Calculations: Same Example
Black/White Ratio

Black Share of Total

Total Stops

35/30 = 1.167

35/65 = 0.538

Guilty

40/20 = 2

40/60= 0.667

Disproportionality

Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio =
1.167/2 = 0.583

Stop Share/Crime Share =
0.538/0.667 = 0.807

Both disproportionality measures are well below 1, from which scholars and
commentators would typically infer that black pedestrians are “understopped” once
you “account for crime.” For example, the Ratio/Ratio interpretation would be that
after accounting for crime, black pedestrians are 58% as likely to be stopped as white
pedestrians. The Share/Share comparison meanwhile implies that the black stop
20
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share is 81% of what it “should” be. Both are very misleading, given that we‟ve
assumed equal policing conditional on criminal conduct. (The Share/Share measure
is less spectacularly wrong here, but it isn‟t always; it‟s just always closer to 1.)
Now consider a second example, in which policing isn‟t racially equitable. Table
2a makes the same assumptions as in Table 1a except for lower white stop
probabilities. Innocent white pedestrians get stopped at a rate of just 15%, while
innocent black pedestrians get stopped at a 25% rate. Meanwhile, guilty white
pedestrians get stopped at a 30% rate, and guilty black pedestrians at a 50% rate.
Table 2b shows the resulting Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share calculations.
Table 2a. Example Assuming Racial Disparity Conditional on Conduct
Black: Assume Innocent Stop Rate = 25%, Guilty Stop Rate = 50%
White: Assume Innocent Stop Rate = 15%, Guilty Stop Rate = 30%
P: 100 Black, 100
Innocents Innocent Stops Guilty Guilty Stops
White
[PI]
[SI]
[PG]
[SG]

Total Stops
[S=SI + SG]

Black (40% Guilty)

60

15

40

20

35

White (20% Guilty)

80

12

20

6

18

Table 2b. Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share Calculations: Same Example
Black/White Ratio

Black Share of Total

Total Stops

35/18 = 1.944

35/53 = 0.660

Guilty

40/20 = 2

40/60= 0.667

Disproportionality

Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio =
1.944/2 = 0.972

Stop Share/Crime Share =
0.660/0.667 = 0.991

Here, the racial distribution of stops approximately equals the racial distribution
of crimes. The black stop share is 66% and the black crime share is 66.7%; the crime
ratio also slightly exceeds the stop ratio. These are the kinds of numbers that police
departments and their supporters routinely cite to show that differences in stop rates
are fully explained by crime differences. Indeed, if anything, these comparisons
create the impression that black pedestrians are very slightly understopped; both
disproportionality measures are slightly below 1. But that conclusion would be very
misleading. Remember, this example assumes that the police are substantially
overstopping black pedestrians—they are 1.67 times as likely to stop a black pedestrian
than a white pedestrian with the same criminal conduct.
These problems with Share/Share and Ratio/Ratio comparisons aren‟t an artifact
of the particular numbers I chose. The Appendix‟s proofs and additional examples
show that anytime group crime rates differ and some innocents are stopped, the
comparisons are at least somewhat misleading, and under many realistic sets of facts,
they can be drastically so. Specifically:
 Racially equal policing of both the innocent and the guilty always results
in the higher-crime group having a lower stop/crime ratio, and a stop
share below its crime share. Thus, both the Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share
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measures are always less than 1, misleadingly suggesting that the highercrime group is less intensively policed once you account for crime.88


If there is racial disparity in average stop rates conditional on criminal
conduct, disfavoring the higher-crime group, Ratio/Ratio and
Share/Share comparisons always misleadingly mask its extent.
Specifically, both measures will always be less than a weighted average of
the true disproportionalities in the policing of the innocent and of the
guilty (DI and DG, as defined above).89 They are also both either less than
DI or less than DG, and are often less than either one;90 these relationships
are explored further in the next Section. In some cases, they misleadingly
reverse the apparent direction of the disparity.91



If policing disparities conditional on criminal conduct disfavor the lowercrime group, the Ratio/Ratio measure always exaggerates this disparity,92
but the Share/Share measure is then more ambiguous. It might actually
understate the disparity, especially if the higher-crime group is relatively
large. This is because of the “dilution” of the Share/Share measure
discussed above, the extent of which depends on relative group size.



Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share comparisons are more misleading when
group crime-rate differences are larger. On the other hand, when there is
no crime-rate difference, the comparisons are fine.93



Because the problem stems from stops of the innocent, both measures
get more misleading when the police are less discerning between guilty
and innocent, and when more of the population is innocent. But as the
number of stopped innocents moves toward zero, the Ratio/Ratio
measure converges on the stop-rate ratio among the guilty (DG).

None of this means it‟s wrong to try to “account for crime.” But dividing by crime
rates or shares is a bad way to account for it.
One might wonder whether there is some other justification for using
Share/Share or Ratio/Ratio Comparisons—some reason to care whether stop and
crime distributions mirror one another, other than the “like cases” principle.
Perhaps there is, but none seems obvious, and those who employ Share/Share or
See Proof 1 and all the examples in Table A1.
See Proof 3 and Table A2, Cols. 1-4; the notes accompanying Table A2 and Proof 3 discuss
several alternative means of weighting the average (the proposition is true for any of them). Proof 3
applies to the Ratio/Ratio measure, but he fact that the Share/Share measure is also lower than any
weighted average of DI and DG that is greater than 1 follows from a combination of Proofs 2 and 3: if
the Ratio/Ratio measure is (while lower) still above 1, the Share/Share measure will be lower yet, and
if the Ratio/Ratio measure is below 1, the Share/Share measure will also be below 1.
90 This follows from the fact that they are lower than the weighted average.
91 See Table A2, Cols. 1-2.
92 Again, it is always lower (in this case, farther below 1) than D and/or D , and lower than their
I
G
weighted average. These points follow from Proof 3.
93 See the last columns in Tables A1 and A2. Proofs 1, 2, and 3 all assume crime-rate differences.
88
89
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Ratio/Ratio comparisons have not articulated any. Rather, the comparisons are
usually presented as though they speak to the question whether like cases are being
treated alike. And audiences are likely to interpret them that way, unless some
alternative interpretation is clearly articulated.94
I do not think these comparisons are deliberately misleading, though they generally
mislead in a particular direction: reducing the appearance of overpolicing of highercrime groups (usually people of color). Both comparison types are routine on both
sides of the race-and-policing debate. They seem intuitively correct, and as research
on other common mathematical mistakes suggests, it is remarkably easy not to notice
when such intuitions are wrong.95
D. Estimating Policing Burdens Conditional on Criminal Conduct
How should researchers assess racial disparities conditional on criminal conduct,
then? If we knew criminal conduct, race, and police interactions for the same sample
(including those not stopped), we could directly estimate race gaps in policeinteraction rates for any given criminal conduct condition, or overall average
disparity conditional on criminal conduct. 96 This may sometimes be possible—in
particular, it is possible for surveys that ask respondents to self-report their criminal
conduct also to ask about policing outcomes. A few surveys of cohorts of youth
have done so, at least with respect to arrest outcomes and certain specific categories
of criminal offending. These generally ask respondents about their behavior over
94 If anything, these comparisons suggest an unattractive “group desert” theory—the idea that a
group‟s total policing burden should track its total crime commission, without regard to which
specific individuals are guilty. Or perhaps police might argue that it‟s rational to attach extra suspicion
to all members of high-crime groups, and to allocate stops in direct proportion to group crime rates.
It‟s not clear that this approach would be efficient, however, and in the next Part, I argue that it‟s
wrong and unconstitutional for the police to infer criminal propensity based on race. In any case, even
if we identified a good reason to allocate stops in proportion to crime shares, it would still be
important to recognize that doing so will mean people with the same conduct systematically face
different apprehension rates depending on race. Policymakers would have to decide whether to
tolerate this breach of the like-cases principle in order to serve some other objective. The literature
that employs Share/Share and Ratio/Ratio comparisons has failed to highlight this conflict.
95 A famous example is the Monty Hall Problem, a brainteaser with a simple but counterintuitive
solution that people (even many mathematicians) overwhelmingly resist even after it is explained. See
John Tierney, Behind Monty Hall‟s Doors, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1991 (describing 10,000 letters sent to a
magazine columnist protesting her correct explanation, including many from mathematics professors).
Humans are so bad at conditional probabilities that (according to a surprisingly large interspeciescomparison literature) we are outperformed on numerous tests by pigeons. E.g., Walter T. Hebranson
& Julia Schroeder, Are Birds Smarter than Mathematicians?, 124 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 1 (2013); Edmund
Fantino et al., Teaching Pigeons to Commit Base-Rate Neglect, 16 PSYCH. SCIENCE 820, 820 (2005).
96 For example, one could estimate a regression, such as:
Stop = β1*Black + β2*Guilty + β3*Guilty*Black + α
Here, β1 is the additive “black” effect for the innocent; β1 + β3 is the additive “black” effect for the
guilty; α is the baseline for white innocents, and α + β2 is the baseline for white guilty. The predicted
probabilities could then be divided to obtain likelihood ratios; for example, DI = (β1 + α)/α. A
regression could also include indicators for many possible crime types or degrees of culpability.
Removing the interaction terms between “black” and the crime variables would produce an overall
average “black” effect conditional on conduct.
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some time period (for example, whether they engaged in certain conduct “often,”
“never,” and so forth) and their arrests over the same period.97 This approach has
some limitations, including the general accuracy and sampling concerns about
surveys mentioned above, plus likely heightened concerns about statistical power.98
But well-designed, large surveys at least have the potential to allow individual-level
estimation of policing outcome disparities conditional on self-reported conduct.99
In the “accounting for crime” literature, however, researchers have typically
used police outcome data that comes from official sources, which has advantages,
including the fact that police data usually cover the full set of police interactions of
interest (e.g., all of a jurisdiction‟s traffic stops), rather than merely the outcomes for
a much smaller surveyed sample. However, crime benchmarks then must come from
some other source. Can these kinds of benchmark comparisons be used to assess
policing disparities conditional on criminal conduct? And can we translate existing
Ratio/Ratio or Share/Share comparisons into the kinds of comparisons we want?
Each of these objectives can be accomplished, but it requires an additional key
piece of information not usually included in benchmark-comparison studies: each
group‟s “hit rate,” the share of those stopped who are guilty. With this information,
we can first translate existing Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio estimates into Stop Ratios for
the guilty:
⁄

⁄

⁄

⁄

*

⁄
⁄

As this equation shows, DG always exceeds the Ratio/Ratio measure unless the highcrime group‟s hit rate is actually below or equal to the low-crime group‟s. If the
crime-rate difference is substantial, this can only happen if the police are much less
accurate vis-à-vis high-crime group members (Table 3, Col. 4 is an example).
97 See, e.g., David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest, 45
DEMOGRAPHY 55 (2008) (analyzing Chicago longitudinal survey of youth cohorts); Robert J.
Sampson, Effect of Socioeconomic Context on Official Reaction to Juvenile Delinquency, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 876
(1986) (discussing the Seattle Youth Survey). In both these examples, the data were also linked to the
study participants‟ official criminal records to check the accuracy of self-reports of arrests. Such
surveys also contain other information about the individual, and studies that use them have generally
analyzed a broad set of predictor variables, rather than focusing on crime and race alone.
98 The sample size needed to estimate differences in arrest rates conditional on a given type of
criminal conduct would be larger than the sample size needed to estimate underlying criminal conduct
differences, because the outcome is much lower-frequency, given that the great majority of criminal
incidents do not result in arrest.
99 Optimally, to assess disparities among the guilty, surveys should ask the outcome of each reported
crime incident. The approach is best suited to crime types for which the respondent is likely to have a
clear memory of each incident (not minor, forgettable conduct like loitering). It would be harder to
expect respondents to also accurately recount all their innocent conduct (for example, how many times
they walked down the street not carrying a weapon), so similar incident-level analyses would be harder
to conduct for overall disparities conditional on criminal conduct or for disparities among the
innocent. However, one could model number of arrests for a particular crime type as a function of
number of times the respondent self-reports engaging in that crime.
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The relationship of DI, the stop-rate disparity among the innocent, to the Stop
Ratio/Crime Ratio measure can also be calculated with the same information:
⁄

⁄

⁄

⁄

*

⁄

⁄

⁄

⁄

The “Miss Rate Ratio” is the intergroup ratio of the shares of stops that are not
“hits,” and the Innocents Ratio is the ratio of the groups‟ innocent populations.
Note that the “Crime Ratio/Innocents Ratio” proportion is necessarily over 1 (again,
assuming group 1 is higher-crime). The Miss Rate Ratio is usually below 1, barring
substantial policing-accuracy differences, but often not dramatically so; if hit rates are
below 50%, the Miss Rate Ratio is less disproportionate than the Hit Rate Ratio. 100
But it always cuts in the opposite direction. Hence, if DG is lower than the Stop
Ratio/Crime Ratio measure, DI must be higher (because both multipliers in the
equation above would be above 1). Simplifying the equation:

The Stop Ratio and Innocents Ratio could equivalently both be replaced with ratios
of stop rates and innocence rates (the population terms cancel).
Alternatively, we can calculate DG and DI if we know the Stop Shares and Crime
Shares plus the hit rates for each of two groups. The Stop Ratio and Crime Ratio can
first be calculated from the shares,101 and then the formulas above can be applied.
As it happens, race-specific hit rates are frequently reported in the policingdisparity literature. Some commentators treat racial equality in hit rates as evidence
that policing disparities have no crime justification, effectively using hit rates as a
proxy for crime rates.102 But in reality, “reported hit rates typically exceed the range
of plausible crime rates,”103 and the relationship between hit rates and crime rates
could differ across races. For example, the Table A2 examples all assume a Crime
Ratio of 2, but the Hit Rate Ratios vary from 0.56 to 2.98.
A recently prominent line of research interprets equal hit rates in just the
opposite way, to imply lack of police racial bias. This approach has complicated and
problematic assumptions, which are examined in detail in Part III. For now, note
that equal hit rates are compatible with stark racial disparities in policing rates
conditional on criminal conduct.104 Conversely, unequal hit rates are the inevitable

100 For example, suppose the black and white hit rates are 0.2 and 0.1 respectively (hit-rate ratio =
2). Then the miss rate ratio is 0.8/0.9, or 0.89. Low hit rates are common for investigative stops; the
NYPD claims a hit rate of 12% for its stop-and-frisk policy (but less than 1% involve weapons).
101 Dividing any group‟s crime share (or stop share) by any other‟s gives a ratio of crimes (or stops).
102 E.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE 79-84 (2002).
103 R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003).
104 The test‟s leading advocate, Nicola Persico, has long acknowledged that the predicted equilibrium
under “unbiased” policing could, depending on various conditions, be highly “unfair.” Persico, Racial
Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1472, 1479 (2002).
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result of equal policing conditional on criminal conduct, if crime rates differ. These
points are illustrated by the Hit Rate Ratios in the Appendix tables.105
But if we have hit-rate and crime-rate information that we trust, we can use that
information in a different way, to estimate the quantities of interest DG and DI. This
is a big “if.” Even setting aside the crime-benchmarking challenges discussed above,
accurate hit rates may be elusive. Hit-rate studies often use arrests to measure hits,
but this is highly problematic. Police have broad arrest discretion, and it is
nonsensical to assume, when assessing racial disparities in stops or searches, that
there is no unjustified racial disparity in arrests. Nor are convictions a good “hit”
measure—conviction depends on prosecutorial discretion and on police testimony.
Police records of whether contraband was found could likewise be affected by
disparities in search intensity or decisions to look the other way.
This problem also bedevils all existing uses of “hit rates” to assess racial
disparities in policing, however.106 If researchers do trust their hit measure, it might as
well be employed in a theoretically sensible way. And some hit measures may be
reasonably reliable because police have little discretion—for example, Breathalyzers
that automatically record results, or crimes that are so serious that police almost
never fail to arrest. How much discretion police have will not be obvious from the
data; researchers need a strong qualitative sense of how policing works in the context
they are studying. When researchers doubt hit measures‟ accuracy, they can use
assumptions about a plausible range of hit rates to estimate bounds on DG and DI.
David Thacher, in an unpublished 2002 paper, came closest to this approach.
Analyzing NYPD‟s stop-and-frisk policy, for each racial group, he counts all stops
not resulting in arrests as stops of innocents, and divides that number by the total
group population. He finds that the probabilities of an innocent person being
stopped are 0.6% for whites, 4.2% for blacks, and 2.9% for Hispanics.107 In addition
to assuming that arrest accurately gauges innocence, Thacher apparently assumes
guilt rates are so negligible that the total population can substitute for the innocent
population. Both assumptions are likely conservative, 108 yet the disparities are
As the Table A1 examples illustrate, if the same shares of the guilty and innocent are stopped
from each group, the group with a higher guilt rate overall must have a higher guilt rate among stops.
Meanwhile, in Table A2, black hit rates are higher in almost every hypothetical (which the advocates
of the “outcome test” would interpret to suggest irrational bias favoring black suspects), including in
Columns 1-3, in which black pedestrians are actually much more heavily policed conditional on
criminal conduct. Moreover, the hit rate ratio in Column 1 is very similar to the one in Column 5,
even though the directions of the policing disparities are reversed. A lower black hit rate is obtained
only when we assume policing that is far less discerning for black pedestrians (Col. 4).
106 Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis of Black-White Disparities in NYPD‟s Stopand-Frisk Program, Working Paper (2013), 13-14, acknowledge this problem, but argue that there is no
evidence police use arrest discretion in racially disparate ways, because arrest rates are uncorrelated by
race after controlling for “crime type” recorded on post-stop forms. This does not help. What the
officer writes down is discretionary, and could be a post hoc rationalization.
107 Thacher, supra note 35, at 37 tbl. 1.
108 The use of arrest to measure hits is conservative if arrest disparities run in the same direction as
stop disparities; the use of the whole population to substitute for innocents is conservative assuming
(as NYPD has contended) that black New Yorkers have a higher crime rate.
105

26
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2015

27

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 110 [2015]

STARR, EXPLAINING RACE GAPS IN POLICING

dramatic. The stop-and-frisk policy doesn‟t look good in terms of disparity in
burdens on the innocent.
But what about disparities affecting the guilty? Thacher does not address this
question for stop-and-frisk, perhaps because doing so would require crime
benchmarks. One cannot simply assume away the existence of the guilty population
when evaluating their stop probabilities. Instead, Thacher praises Lamberth‟s
Turnpike study for having “properly estimated the distribution of burdens on the
guilty.”109 Is this praise merited? Well, recall that Lamberth found that virtually all
drivers were guilty of (minimal) speeding; if minimal speeding is the proper measure
of “guilt” (which has been sharply contested), then there would be very few stops of
the innocent, so the problems outlined in the previous section wouldn‟t emerge.110
But Thacher does not explain how disparities affecting the guilty should be estimated
when guilt is less universal, nor how disparities affecting the innocent should be
estimated when guilt rates are nontrivial.
Both, however, can be estimated, albeit not easily. When we lack either a good
crime benchmark or a good hit measure, the best we may be able to do is to offer a
reasonable range of estimates based on assumptions. But even if the questions posed
by the “like cases” framework are empirically challenging, they are the right questions
if we want to “account for crime” in a normatively meaningful way.
III. Measuring Racial Discrimination in Police Decision-Making
What if we want to go beyond asking whether policing disparities are explained
by crime commission, and instead ask whether they are driven by racial
discrimination? This Part assesses this question, beginning by asking why it is
constitutionally central and morally important. Section B examines causal inference
problems that complicate the task. Section C considers the literature‟s main
approaches: the “hit-rate” test, regression studies of stops and post-stop outcomes,
studies exploiting variations in ability to observe race, and lab studies of implicit
biases. Finally, Section D argues for a new strategy—the use of “testers,” like those
used in other antidiscrimination enforcement and research contexts—and addresses
how to address practical, safety, and ethical concerns specific to the policing context.
A. The Constitutional and Moral Case Against Racial Profiling
While many causes of policing disparity raise policy concerns, the role of
governmental discrimination is the key question posed by equal protection doctrine.
Current doctrine precludes constitutional challenges solely premised on racially
disparate impact111 or discrimination by private actors like witnesses.112 But, as I show
Id. at 24.
Lamberth actually divided each group‟s stop share by its share of all drivers on the road. If
almost everyone is guilty, this is close to a Stop Share/Crime Share comparison.
111 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).
112 One could argue that when the police give effect to such private discrimination by carrying out
stops and arrests, state action is generated. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (barring judicial
enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants). But doctrinally, this is likely a nonstarter. See
Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40 (2006) (dismissing a similar hypothetical
109
110
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here, police racial discrimination essentially always violates the Equal Protection
Clause. It is, however, difficult to prove, which makes effective empirical strategies
especially important—for parties to litigation, for courts, for Congress should it
legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment, and for police departments who wish to
comply with the Constitution and avoid litigation. Moreover, the disparate treatment
question matters for other normative reasons as well.
Although there is a strong scholarly consensus that racial profiling should be
considered unconstitutional, scholars often question whether the Supreme Court
agrees. Many have critiqued the Court for leaving the door open to police reliance
on race.113 These critics have grounds for frustration: the Court has avoided squarely
deciding the Fourteenth Amendment issue and has meanwhile foreclosed Fourth
Amendment strategies. Moreover, lower courts have been unwilling to second-guess
police reliance on race-specific suspect identifications, even in extreme cases.114 Still,
broader equal protection doctrine leaves little ambiguity. Racial profiling (by which I
mean reliance on conscious or subconscious racial generalizations about criminality,
as opposed to specific suspect identifications) clearly violates the Equal Protection
Clause as the Court has consistently interpreted it.115
Scholars examining the relevant constitutional doctrine have mainly focused on
the Court‟s numerous adverse Fourth Amendment precedents. 116 These include
Whren v. United States, holding that a traffic stop provides probable cause for a vehicle
search even if the traffic violation was a mere pretext,117 and United States v. BrignoniPonce, which suggested that Mexican appearance might provide reasonable suspicion
extension of Shelley); David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
935, 966-83 (1989) (reviewing post-Shelley doctrine). It would also set a difficult standard for police,
who may not know when witnesses are racially biased.
113 E.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 1006; Delores Jones-Brown & Brian A. Maule, Racially Biased
Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 141-43; Paulaumus et al., supra note 43,
at 242-43; Evan Gerstman & Christopher Shortell, The Many Faces of Strict Scrutiny, 72 U. PITT. L. REV.
1, 46-50 (2001); Alschuler, supra note 27, at 164-66; Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 425, 442-43 (1997).
114 Notoriously, in Brown et al. v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2000), the Second Circuit upheld the
interrogation of 200 black men based on a white victim‟s description of a black male assailant. For
critiques, see Gerstman & Shortell, supra note 113, at 47; Alschuler, supra note 27, at 179-92. Oneonta‟s
facts were shocking; one can hardly imagine a race-reversed scenario in which 200 white men were
stopped. But plaintiffs do not win equal protection cases based on what one can and can‟t imagine,
even if sometimes they should. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (requiring an actual
comparison group). Broad sweeps like this may still be attacked for lack of Fourth Amendment
individualized suspicion; the court in Oneonta allowed that argument to proceed. 221 F.3d at 334. In
any event, courts consistently distinguish racially specific suspect descriptions from behavioral
generalizations about groups. See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1078-80 (2001) (critiquing this distinction).
115 The Sixth Circuit has gotten this issue wrong, however. E.g., United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170,
174 (1995); see Alschuler, supra note 27, at 178-79 (critiquing these cases).
116 E.g., Jones-Brown & Maule, supra note 113, at 140-57; Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and
Broken Windows Revisited, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 6, at 312-13; Johnson, supra
note 5, at 1006-08.
117 517 U.S. 806, 813-16 (1996).
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of an immigration violation when combined with other factors, but not alone.118 But
these cases do not implicate equal protection claims. Brignoni-Ponce sent a confusing
signal (why suggest that ethnicity may be relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis if
its consideration is barred by the Fourteenth?), but it does not trump the many equal
protection cases striking down decision-makers‟ use of race even alongside other
factors. 119 Many scholars have critiqued the doctrinal separation of Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment objections to racial profiling,120 but its upside is that adverse
holdings on the former do not preclude the latter.121
The Supreme Court has never decided whether racial profiling violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, but to say no, it would have to upend decades of doctrine.
The key line of cases concerns the prohibition on “statistical discrimination.” The
Supreme Court has consistently held that otherwise-impermissible discrimination
cannot be justified based on group generalizations, even if those generalizations are
empirically accurate. Instead, individuals must be treated as individuals.122
For example, in Craig v. Boren, the Court struck down a law applying different
drinking ages to men and women. It was unmoved by studies showing that young
men drove drunk at ten times the rate of young women, because these findings
lumped all young men together. 123 Similarly, the Court has struck down
governmental reliance on gendered or racial generalizations about learning styles,124
juror voting,125 and workforce participation.126 All these generalizations had statistical
support, but the Court made clear that this doesn‟t matter: basing disparate treatment
on groups‟ typical tendencies is unfair to atypical individuals. The Court has carved
out exceptions only for physical sex differences relating to pregnancy.127 It has never
made exceptions for generalizations about behavior, and it would be shocking if it
did so for racial generalizations about criminal tendencies.

422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975); see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
E.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); see
Gross & Barnes, supra note 11, at 740.
120 E.g., Alschuler, supra note 27, at 193 (reviewing commentary); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops,
Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 309-29 (1997).
121 Scholars have suggested that Whren and related cases green-light racial profiling in car searches.
See Jones-Brown & Maule, supra, at 153-57 (also citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) and
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)); Paulhaumus et al., supra note 43, at 242-43; Fagan et
al., supra note 116, at 312. This is likely often true in practice, because allowing pretextual justifications
makes it harder to prove racial discrimination. But Whren did not suggest it would be legal to rely on
race—it suggested otherwise. 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment”).
122 See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 S TAN.
L. REV. 803, 823-29 (2014) (analyzing these cases).
123 429 U.S. 190, 202-04 (1976).
124 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996).
125 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90,
97-98 (1986).
126 See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
690-91 (1973).
127 See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001).
118
119
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This line of cases should be fatal to any attempt to justify racial profiling by
arguing that profiles are empirically supported. This is so even assuming crime
prevention is a compelling state interest.128 In none of the cases reviewed above did
the Court assess whether the statistical generalization in question established an
important government interest. Rather, the prohibition on statistical discrimination is
best understood to constrain the kinds of reasoning that the government can offer to
establish its interest. Otherwise, the law in Boren might well have survived scrutiny,
for example. The government clearly has an important interest in preventing drunk
driving—yet it was barred from using statistical evidence to show a relationship
between that interest and the gender classification.
Moreover, law enforcement bodies have generally agreed that profiling is illegal.
For example, in 2003 DOJ declared it “absolutely prohibited.” 129 The remaining
ambiguity in the case law may therefore be irrelevant in practice. Modern police
departments don‟t defend racial profiling. They deny that they engage in it.130 Most
profiling lawsuits have settled on terms prohibiting it.131
But if the Fourteenth Amendment argument is doctrinally well supported and
not in practice contested, why has the Fourth Amendment played a more prominent
role in profiling litigation? The key problem is evidentiary: it‟s hard for litigants to
prove racial profiling, and especially to prove that it affected any specific case. 132
Individual criminal defendants raising selective-enforcement defenses face very steep
hurdles.133 In federal criminal cases, even getting discovery on the issue is notoriously
difficult.134 And even if defendants can show a pattern of discrimination, they must
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (listing prohibition on gender generalizations
and a substantial relationship to important government interests as separate requirements).
129
U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: RACIAL PROFILING 3 (2003),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf.
130 E.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing Arizona sheriff‟s defense to
equal protection suit: “Defendants do not engage in racial profiling”); News Hour with Jim Lehrer,
Aug. 13, 2013 (quoting NYPD Commissioner: “We do not engage in racial profiling. It is prohibited
by law [and] by our own regulations.”); Sho Wills, Chicago, New York Officers Spar Over Stop-and-Frisk
Policy, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/14/us/new-york-chicago-stop-frisk/ (Aug. 14, 2014)
(quoting Chicago PD spokesman); Greg Risling, DOJ Finds Two LA Sheriff‟s Stations Discriminating,
ASSOC. PRESS (June 28, 2013) (describing L.A. County Sheriffs‟ response to DOJ investigation); All
Police to Attend Racial Profiling Class, BURLINGTON CNTY. TIMES (June 29, 2005) (stating that all New
Jersey police officers must attend training teaching unconstitutionality of profiling); Jane Prendergast,
Officers' Hearts Hold Racial Profiling Solution, Chief Says, CIN. ENQUIRER (Mar. 6, 2011) (quoting
Cincinnati police chief: Profiling “is not only wrong, it's unconstitutional. It's illegal. We know that.
We teach that.”); Letter from S.C. Kitchen to Assistant U.S. Attorney General Thomas E. Perez,
(September 26, 2013), http://www.timesnewshosting.com/docs/johnson.pdf (denying profiling).
131 See Gross & Barnes, supra note 11, at 741-43.
132 See id. at 653-57, 741; David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 296, 322-29 (2001); Johnson, supra note 5, at 1063-64.
133 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 354 (“Research has uncovered no cases” of convictions
overturned for selective prosecution, as of 1997).
134 The Supreme Court has required “some evidence” of “differential treatment of similarly situated
members of other races.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465-67. Identifying a “similarly situated” group is
notoriously difficult, and may be more so in policing cases: police keep no “records of instances in
which they could have stopped a motorist…but did not.” Davis, supra note 113, at 437-38.
128
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also show that it affected their cases specifically. Statistical evidence about broader
patterns almost never clears this hurdle alone, though it might help in combination
with case-specific qualitative evidence.135 For these reasons, the best prospects for
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to succeed are in civil cases (class actions or
government enforcement actions), in which the pattern of discrimination is the issue.
Such cases turn centrally on statistical evidence.
Some commentators, while acknowledging the legal importance of the disparatetreatment question, have dismissed its moral importance. Thacher, for example,
describes the focus on “racial profiling” as a parochial concern of lawyers—a
distraction from “substantive” equality. 136 In fact, however, this call for a move
beyond colorblindness echoes a view that has long been common in legal scholarship
beyond the policing context: that equality law should primarily target group
subordination, not forbidden classifications.137
I generally sympathize with this antisubordination view. But whether the police
racially discriminate is not “merely” a legalistic concern. Racially disparate treatment
adds a substantively meaningful dimension of harm. Critics of racial disparities in
policing (not just lawyers) have emphasized the role of discrimination, “racial
profiling,” or just “racism.”138 This framing has cultural resonance and moral force.139
For the government to generalize that people of color are dangerous, and to
specifically target them for surveillance and arrest, is expressively and morally
noxious, especially because such generalizations have a painful history in our
culture.140 I am not suggesting that one should not acknowledge racial differences in
crime rates. But the poisonous aspect is using those differences to justify ignoring
differences within groups, making law-abiding citizens “pay for fears generated by
criminals with which they are lumped by dint of color.”141
In principle, strong statistical evidence could allow an inference that the defendant probably would
not have been stopped but for race. But courts have resisted this sort of reasoning, see Harcourt, supra
note 13, at 1278, just as they are often uncomfortable inferring individual causation from statistics in
other kinds of cases, see Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1349-51 (1971). In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Court refused
to allow a defendant‟s challenge to his capital sentence to rest solely on statistical findings of racial
disparity in death penalty administration. This holding emphasized deference to prosecutors and
juries, and could possibly be distinguished in a challenge to police racial profiling; the Court has
upheld equal protection claims based on statistical evidence in some other criminal-law contexts. E.g.,
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
136 Thacher, supra note 35, at 26; see supra note 40 (addressing other critics of discrimination focus).
137 E.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003).
138 E.g., The Targeting of Young Blacks by Law Enforcement: Ben Jealous in Conversation with Jamelle Bouie,
AM. PROSPECT, Fall 2014; Rockeymoore et al, supra note 3; Statement of Rep. John Lewis,
http://johnlewis.house.gov/press-release/rep-john-lewis-shooting-michael-brown-and-eventsferguson-missouri.
139 See BLANK ET AL., supra note 84, at 103 (stating more generally that “the broader public vision of
what discrimination means [is] the treatment of two (nearly) identical people differently”).
140 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 30, at 16; Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1987); Barack Obama, Remarks on Trayvon Martin, July 19, 2013.
141 KENNEDY, supra note 30, at xi.
135
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The harms of racially disparate policing are thus often substantially connected to
racial targeting, not just to police interactions per se. Perceptions of police racism also
deeply undercut trust in the police in black communities, which may undermine
police effectiveness. 142 In short, racial discrimination may be just one morally
troubling cause of racial disparity, but it‟s an important one.
B. Race and the Problem of Causal Inference
Identifying the effects of racial discrimination is even harder than assessing racial
disparities in policing of people with like criminal conduct. The latter inquiry need
not involve causal claims; the racial discrimination question does. 143 Answering it
requires researchers to disentangle not only the role of crime but also all other
potentially confounding variables. This is challenging, because race is not a
“treatment” subject to manipulation. Its effects are intertwined with each individual‟s
other attributes and life experiences—which may themselves have been influenced
by race. Scholars have therefore debated whether the language of causal inference
can be meaningfully applied to race at all.144 Perhaps we can‟t sensibly ask how a
person‟s outcome would have differed but for her race if her entire life would have
been different in that counterfactual.
This conceptual hurdle is not insuperable, however. Usually, when we ask causal
questions about race (“Do police officers stop more African-Americans because of
their race?”), we‟re not asking about race‟s total, lifelong effects, but about racial
discrimination in a particular decision process. 145 The counterfactual is how the
decision-maker would have responded if she had instead encountered another
person of a different race but otherwise similar relevant characteristics. James
Greiner and Donald Rubin have suggested referring to “perceived race” to highlight
this point.146 In my view, while the point is sound, there‟s little harm in the shorthand
“effect of race,” provided we are clear on what it means.147
But isolating “effects of race” even in this narrower sense is difficult. It is not
just that race resists experimental manipulation; for any given individual, it does not
vary naturally either. Immutable traits defy observational researchers‟ best tools for
causal inference, such as panel designs (which follow individuals before and after a
treatment) or quasi-experiments exploiting shocks to a treatment. 148 Instead,
See id. at 151-53; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation, in RACE, ETHNICITY,
supra note 6, at 102-04; Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 2, at 1017-18.
143 See, e.g., Lincoln Quillian, New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination, 32
ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 299, 302 (defining “discrimination” as “the causal effect of race”).
144 D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, Causal Effects of Perceived Immutable Characteristics, 93 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 775, 783-84 (2011); Maya Sen & Omar Wasow, Reconciling Race and Causation (2014),
https://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Wasow04092014/race_causation_4.pdf.
145 If one did want to examine “the effect of dynamic, cumulative discrimination,” BLANK ET AL.,
supra note 84, at 226, the strategies discussed here wouldn‟t much help; raw disparity estimates might.
146 Greiner & Rubin, supra note 144, at 775.
147 “Effect of perceived race” is itself a shorthand; every individual has been affected by perceptions
of her race her whole life.
148 Quasi-experimental designs can be used to assess changes or differences in racial disparity. See,
e.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013)
142
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researchers must use methods—such as regression, reweighting, and matching—that
share a core limitation: their ability to support causal inferences depends on the
ability to observe the potentially confounding variables. 149 Because one can never
really exclude the possibility of omitted variables, careful researchers often refer to
the race gaps that remain after controlling for observed variables simply as
“unexplained,” rather than claiming proof of discrimination.150
Still, neither policy analysis nor law requires definitive answers. For policy
purposes, strong causal identification would be great, but even an analysis with
weaker identification can usefully narrow down the possibilities; theoretically
informed discussion can then guide interpretation of unexplained gaps. In civil
litigation, the traditional burden of proof requires that the factfinder believe the best
interpretation of the evidence is that discrimination probably had some effect. After
all, non-statistical evidence of causation (and other contested facts) is often also open
to multiple interpretations. While courts have sometimes demanded more clarity out
of statistical evidence, certainty or even near-certainty is too much to ask for. 151
Moreover (though there is no clear doctrine on this), it should be unnecessary to rule
out every theoretically possible confounding variable in order to support an equal
protection claim. Instead, the key question should be whether the explanations for
disparities that the police department gives hold up.152
In the remainder of this discussion, I assume that strong causal identification is
the ideal goal of research on police racial discrimination. However, I also examine
what we can learn from observational research that falls somewhat short of this goal.
C. Current Methods of Measuring Police Racial Discrimination
How might one isolate the effects of police racial discrimination? In this Section,
I consider several approaches from the literature: the “hit-rate” test, neighborhoodlevel studies of initial stops, studies of post-stop decisions, studies exploiting
variations in decision-makers‟ information about race, and lab experiments on
(using regression discontinuity design); David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in their Treatment of Race?,
41 J. LEGAL STUDIES 347 (2012) (exploiting random assignment of judges).
149 Regression models express some functional relationship between variables; the function is fit to
data to solve for its parameters, identifying each covariate‟s association with the outcome when the
others are held constant. Reweighting and matching are methods of rendering groups comparable in
characteristics before comparing their outcomes.
150 See, e.g., Quillian, supra note 143, at 303.
151 The case that set the hardest standard was McCleskey, in which the Supreme Court, invoking
deference to prosecutors and jurors, held that “exceptionally clear proof” of discrimination was
required to support a challenge to the death penalty. But it is not obvious that McCleskey‟s reasoning
applies to policing at all, see supra note 135, or that it applies to civil lawsuits alleging a pattern of
discrimination. McCleskey (and every federal appellate case following it) centers on the problem of
inferring discrimination in an individual criminal case from a broader statistical pattern.
152 In petit and grand jury discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has required the state to
articulate reasons for its decisions and “stand or fall on the plausibility” of those reasons. Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005); see Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1970) (holding that
this burden-shifting can be triggered by statistical evidence of disparate impact); see also McDonnellDouglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing similar requirement in Title VII cases).
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implicit biases. While I do not return to the crime-benchmark comparisons
addressed in Part II, such comparisons have also often been presented as methods
for assessing “racial profiling”—implying that if crime differences do not explain
policing differences, racial discrimination does.153 This inference could be reasonable,
but only absent plausible alternative explanations.154
1. The Hit-Rate Test
In recent years, the most prominent strategy for causal inference about race and
policing has been the hit-rate test.155 In Part II.D, I showed briefly that this test does
not address equality in policing conditional on criminal conduct. Here, I show that it
also fails to identify racial discrimination—or anything we likely want to know.
The method posits that unbiased police seek to maximize the probability of
detecting crime, and thus shift their attention toward groups with higher “hit
rates.”156 Those groups then reduce their crime rates, which leads to police stopping
them less, and so forth. At equilibrium, all groups have the same hit rates (and crime
rates). On this view, unequal hit rates suggest racial bias: police who fail to shift stops
to the higher-rate group must irrationally prefer to stop the other group.157 Equal hit
rates suggest no bias. 158 The underlying theory distinguishes “taste-based”
discrimination (prejudice) from statistical discrimination (use of race as a proxy for a
legitimate consideration). Economists sometimes defend the latter as efficient.159
But even if it is, it wouldn‟t render racial discrimination constitutional. As the
previous Section outlined, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the
distinction between taste-based and statistical discrimination: it is no defense that
police were “correct” to consider race. And the model‟s vision of “unbiased”
policing does not merely allow unconstitutional statistical discrimination—it requires it.
Unbiased police are expected to track hit rates by race and to target high-rate racial
groups until rates equalize. Failure to do so is interpreted as irrational bias against the

For example, the various Turnpike studies were designed to test racial profiling allegations.
For instance, perhaps highway troopers are not able to observe much besides speed and race.
155 See Engel, supra note 40, at 16 (describing this test as “the analytical strategy of choice [for] many
researchers, police administrators, court officials, citizen groups, and other stakeholders”).
156 The seminal paper is John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence,
109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001); see also Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Generalizing the Hit Rates Test for
Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, with an Application to Vehicle Searches in Wichita, 116 ECON. J. F351 (2006);
Ruben Hernández-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate
Data, 45 INT'L ECON. REV. 959 (2004); Persico, supra note 104.
157 E.g., Hernández-Murillo & Knowles, supra note 156, at 959; Sean Childers, Note, Discrimination
During Traffic Stops, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1025 , 1041 (2012).
158 E.g., Persico & Todd, supra, at F361; Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial
Profiling, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163, 171-72 (2009); Joseph A. Schafer et al., Decision-making in Traffic
Stop Encounters, 9 POLICE Q. 184, 200 (2006).
159 See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REV.
659 (1972). Economists have debated the conditions under which statistical discrimination is efficient.
E.g., Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228 (1986); Peter
Norman, Statistical Discrimination and Efficiency, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 615 (2003).
153
154
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lower-rate group. It would thus be wholly inappropriate for courts to use the
approach to test for unconstitutional discrimination, as some propose.160
The approach is also unsatisfying on policy grounds: it in fact tests neither
equality nor efficiency. As to equality, the test embraces race-based policing and
toxic racial generalizations about criminality, and as discussed in Part II, equal hit
rates are completely consistent with stark differences in treatment of those with the
same criminal conduct. As to efficiency, the test does not speak to whether police
are minimizing crime, much less maximizing total social utility. Rather, under strong
assumptions, it measures whether police maximize arrests. Maximizing arrests and
minimizing crime are not synonymous. A race-conscious crime-minimization
strategy would have to focus not on hit rates, but on responsiveness to policing. As
Bernard Harcourt has shown, policing that targets higher-crime groups can increase
net crime if those groups respond less favorably to police presence.161
Indeed, some of the test‟s leading proponents have acknowledged this point, but
have argued that officers‟ career incentives favor maximizing arrests, not reducing
crime, so from their perspective, maximizing hit rates is rational.162 Descriptively, this
could be right. But why should researchers or policymakers share this objective?
Essentially, the hit-rate model tests whether officers are racially discriminating in a
way that serves their career goals, and not in other ways that do not. A police
department that “passes” that test should hardly be proud of it.
Even as a test of whether police maximize arrests, the approach may tell us little,
because it relies on extremely strong and dubious assumptions. First, it assumes the
hit measure is itself untainted by discrimination, a problem discussed in Part II.
Second, it assumes police accurately track hit rates by race and shift stop patterns
accordingly. This is probably rarely true.163 Third, the model assumes that potential
criminals know their stop probabilities, update that information when the police shift
stop patterns, and change their behavior accordingly. But potential criminals actually
face highly ambiguous information about detection rates, 164 and when those rates
change, they often don‟t adjust their behavior proportionally.165 Fourth, the model
also assumes officers simultaneously track hit-rate differences across all other
characteristics and behaviors that they observe and adjust stop rates accordingly, and
160 Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F.Supp.2d 417, 450-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (describing NYPD‟s
argument); Nicola Persico & David A. Castleman, Detecting Bias: Using Statistical Evidence to Establish
Intentional Discrimination in Racial Profiling Cases, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 233 (2005). Others have
correctly responded that taste-based discrimination is only one subset of disparate treatment. E.g., Ian
Ayres, Three Tests for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ Transplantation, 48 PERSP. IN BIOL. &
MED. S68, S80 (2005). Engel, supra note 40, at 3, puzzlingly equates statistical discrimination to
disparate impact discrimination; it is disparate treatment.
161 Harcourt, supra note 13, at 1296-1307.
162 Persico, supra note 104, at 1473-74; Coviello & Persico, supra note 106, at 6-11 (explaining that
the test doesn‟t work for allocation of police among precincts, which likely does aim to reduce crime).
163
Only recently have some departments tracked stops and searches by race, and it‟s unlikely that
officers regularly check these figures and understand how to interpret them.
164 See Thomas A. Loughran, On Ambiguity in Risk Perceptions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 1029 (2011); Lance
Lochner, Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System, NBER Working Paper 9474, at 1 (2006).
165 Lochner, supra note 164, at 29; see also Engel, supra note 40, at 25 (raising a similar criticism).
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that individuals respond such that equal-hit-rate equilibria are produced across all
those characteristics and behaviors. This assumption is crucial to solving the
“inframarginality problem” that would otherwise invalidate the model.166
In addition, the model does not overcome the key problem of omitted variable
bias. The discrimination being measured could be a “taste” for an unobserved racecorrelated trait, not race itself.167 Finally, the model predicts that each group‟s hit rate
will equal its crime rate, 168 but this is demonstrably false: observed hit rates often
vastly exceed plausible underlying crime rates.169
In short, the hit-rate approach has little but mathematical elegance to
recommend it. Several of the concerns raised here have been raised by others and
conceded by the model‟s creators—but these concessions are quite serious, and go to
the heart of whether we should trust the model. The test‟s continued prevalence is
puzzling, and presumably stems from the perceived absence of viable alternatives.170
But in my view, several of the approaches reviewed below are superior despite their
limitations; and in Section D, I propose a new alternative.
2. Neighborhood-Level Studies of Stop Probability
Again, for the most part we lack individual-level, general-population data about
underlying criminal conduct, a problem for studies of initial stop probability. It might
be possible to construct data sources (especially self-report surveys) that include
crime information, stop information, and other potential confounding variables; the
self-report surveys discussed in the previous Part have focused on arrests. For now,
however, regression studies of initial stop probability have generally focused on
neighborhood- or precinct-level disparities, there are plausible crime benchmarks
available. Researchers can study whether police appear to be treating minority
166 This is why the hit-rate model has to be so complicated. One might have imagined a simpler
statistical-discrimination story: police are rational Bayesians who interpret signals of “suspiciousness”
in light of race-specific base rates and apply a lower suspiciousness bar for stopping one race than
another. But whether the police have lowered the bar rationally—such that the marginal cases for each
rate have the same hit rates—cannot be tested empirically by comparing average hit rates, which are
calculated based on the whole group. Unfortunately, the data don‟t tell us which cases were on the
margin. Knowles et al.‟s model solves this problem by assuming hit rates equalize across all the other
traits or behaviors that police observe—so at equilibrium, these traits tell police nothing, and all
individuals are equally suspicious; all are marginal. See Knowles et al., supra note 156, at 209-12.
167 It is often said, even by critics, that the model‟s main advantage is that it avoids omitted variable
bias. See, e.g., Childers, supra note 157, at 1033-35; Engel, supra note 40, at 16; Ayres, supra, at S79. This
is a strange claim, because the model cannot empirically distinguish between racial discrimination and
discrimination based on unobserved race-correlated traits; it assumes away the latter.
168 See Coviello & Persico, supra note 106, at Appendix 11. This is a consequence of the equilibria
assumed across all other traits; see supra note 166. When NYPD argues both that stop-and-frisk hit rates
are equal across races, Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 450-53, and that crime rates are not, id. at 584, it is
contradicting itself. If both facts are true, the hit-rate model‟s assumptions are not. See Persico, supra
note 104, at 1473 (“At equilibrium it cannot be that one group has a lower fraction of criminals.”).
169 See Banks, supra note 103, at 583; Harcourt, supra, at 1307-08. NYPD‟s stop-and-frisk program
may be an exception; see supra note 87.
170 Some suggest that the model‟s estimate of “taste-based” discrimination is a useful lower bound for
unconstitutional discrimination. E.g., Childers, supra note 157, at 1028. But the model‟s problematic
assumptions and the omitted variable bias problem threaten the “lower bound” interpretation as well.
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neighborhoods differently, and control for reported neighborhood crime and other
neighborhood characteristics. Such studies cannot assess the effect of individual race
on stops. But they represent the best current strategy for assessing whether
neighborhoods are treated differently based on race.
A good example is the analysis of precinct-level disparities presented in the
report of the plaintiffs‟ expert, Jeffrey Fagan, in the Floyd stop-and-frisk litigation.171
Fagan‟s analysis regressed precinct stop rates on various racial groups‟ population
share; controls included crime complaints the previous quarter, neighborhood
socioeconomic and other demographic characteristics, and size of the precinct‟s
police force.172 The report found that black and Hispanic population share strongly
predicted stop rates,173 and the district court agreed.174
Crime rate controls in regressions could, in principle, could raise concerns like
those explored in Part II. A neighborhood‟s stop rate incorporates stops of the guilty
and the innocent, so we shouldn‟t expect it to be proportional to the neighborhood
crime rate if individuals are stopped at equal rates across neighborhoods conditional
on criminal conduct.175 But our focus in this Part is whether the police are racially
discriminating, not whether individuals with like conduct are being treated alike, so it
makes sense to control for other factors that the police are taking into account. And
when a department is making inter-neighborhood police allocation decisions, it very
likely does consider neighborhood crime rates.176
Neighborhood regressions are affected by two other by-now-familiar problems:
limited crime data and omitted variable bias. So researchers need to consider their
crime benchmarks carefully, and should not claim to have “proven” discrimination
or its absence decisively (although, again, results need not have a definitive causal
interpretation to be useful).
3. Individual-Level Studies of Post-Stop Decisions
Some studies focus on disparities in searches, arrests, or other sanctions among
stopped persons, controlling for other defendant and neighborhood characteristics
and sometimes for the stop justification recorded by the officer. 177 Beyond the
Floyd v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 1034, Report of Jeffrey Fagan 30-34.
Id. The force size control means that the model does not test discrimination in allocation of police
among precincts. An alternative model omitted this control, and estimated larger race gaps. Id. at 36.
173 Id. at 32-34. The magnitudes suggest that moving from an entirely white neighborhood to an
entirely black or Hispanic neighborhood would, other factors equal, nearly double the stop rate.
The plaintiffs‟ additional multilevel models assessed racial disparities within precincts as well. Id.
at 40-45. These models do not have individual-level controls for criminal conduct or other possible
individual-level confounders, which is a weakness from a causal inference perspective. On the other
hand, if NYPD really was stopping people essentially at random, crime controls may have been
unnecessary, for reasons discussed supra note 87.
174 Floyd, 959 F.Supp.2d at 560.
175 The math is not identical, because here the regressions include more variables and vary in
functional form; many don‟t model the relationship between variables as a likelihood ratio.
176 One cannot similarly defend race-specific neighborhood crime controls, which the NYPD argued
for in certain analyses in Floyd. 959 F.Supp.2d at 584. Reliance on overall neighborhood crime rates is
unconstitutional; reliance on race-specific group generalizations is not.
177 E.g., Pickerill et al., supra note 40, at 9-19; Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 6, at 196; Greg
171
172
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general omitted variable concern, the major limitations parallel those of studies of
the post-arrest process, discussed in Part I.A: sample selection and post-treatmentcontrol problems stemming from possible racial bias in the stop decision. When
studying possible post-stop discrimination, one can‟t just assume that the stop
decision by the same officer was unbiased. This is the mirror image of one of the
problems discussed above with hit-rate studies, which instead assume that post-stop
outcomes are objective measures of whether the stop was valid.
For example, consider Smith and Petrocelli‟s study of Richmond traffic stops.
After controlling for officer and defendant traits and the stop location‟s crime rate,
they found that among those stopped, minority drivers were substantially less likely to
be ticketed or arrested.178 What does that finding mean? The authors acknowledge
the ambiguity, offering two possible interpretations: that the police avoided
sanctioning minorities because they knew they were being studied, or that they
sanctioned them less often because more of them had been unjustifiably stopped (an
interpretation that shares the intuition of the hit-rate studies). Notice that these
interpretations support opposite conclusions about the direction of discrimination.
One solution to challenges like this is to combine analyses of post-stop outcomes
with analyses of stop disparities, allowing estimates of unexplained post-stop
disparities to be corrected for sample selection due to disparate stops.179 But this is
only viable when there is a sound method available for analyzing stops.
The literature on post-stop disparities also illustrates the importance and
difficulty of choosing the right control variables. Again, we see more variations on a
by-now familiar theme: researchers often estimate biases in police decisions while
assuming that other police decisions are unbiased. For example, analyses of search
rates often control for whether the individual is arrested or otherwise sanctioned.180
The apparent rationale is that arrests and sanctions reflect conduct differences,
and/or that searches incident to arrest are not discretionary. But arrest and sanction
decisions are themselves discretionary (and thus potentially discriminatory). 181
Moreover, some arrests result from searches, not vice-versa, and some arrests may be
motivated by the desire to carry out a search incident to arrest. When studying search
decisions, it‟s inappropriate to control for something that‟s itself an outcome of the
search decision; doing so likely biases disparity estimates downward.
More difficult dilemmas are posed by efforts to control for behavior as recorded
Ridgeway, Assessing the Effect of Race Bias in Post-Traffic Stop Outcomes Using Propensity Scores, 22 J. QUANT.
CRIM. 1 (2006).
178 Smith & Petrocelli, supra note 4, at 19-20.
179 For example, two studies have compared traffic stop rates to violation rates measured via
physical observation, then analyzed post-stop outcomes. See Engel et al., supra note 60, at 157 (finding
that black and Hispanic drivers faced triple whites‟ search probability); Alpert et al., supra note 61, at
47 (finding no search-probability difference). Neither study‟s post-stop analysis corrected for sample
selection, though in Alpert et al.‟s study, this made sense because no stop disparity was found. Both
studies‟ analyses of stop disparities are subject to the interpretive concerns raised in Part II.
180 See e.g., Alpert et al., supra note 61, at 47 (arrest); Pickerill et al., supra note 40, at 9-19 (citations).
181 Likewise, it is misleading to refer to searches incident to arrest as “low-discretion” searches, e.g.,
Pickerill et al., supra note 40, at 15, given that the arrest decision itself is highly discretionary.
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by officers. For example, a Cleveland study found that officers more often described
black drivers as noncompliant or disrespectful; arrest disparities disappeared after
controlling for these descriptions.182 The RAND study of NYPD‟s frisk, search, and
sanction rates similarly controlled for “evasiveness, … appearing to be casing, acting
as a lookout, wearing clothes consistent with those commonly used in crime, making
furtive movements, acting in a manner consistent with a drug transaction or a violent
crime, or having a suspicious bulge.”183 But officers‟ descriptions of these traits could
be affected by race, or by the search or sanction decision itself (they could be post
hoc justifications). These control variables could thus filter out part of what
researchers are trying to measure. Other studies exclude such subjective factors from
their models. I believe this is the better choice, but it does risk omitted variable bias
if the descriptions reflect real differences.
As discussed above, a few self-report surveys (generally focused on youth) have
included both criminal conduct and arrest questions, and these also ask a variety of
other questions that relate to some potential confounding variables. It is possible to
use these surveys to try to disentangle race‟s effects from those of other variables
predicting arrest. 184 These studies are not affected by sample selection concerns
stemming from the stop decision, because their samples are not confined to those
stopped. However, they are still subject to concerns about omitted variables and
about use of inappropriate controls. If a study uses only self-report information, it
may omit factors relevant to police decisions but not known to the respondent (or
asked about by the survey). Self-report data can sometimes be linked to official
outcome data, but this does not really help with the omitted variable problem,
because this official data won‟t cover people the police did not file reports on.
There are no perfect choices. In the best-case scenario, researchers will be able
to make assumptions about selection bias and choice of control variables that have
theoretical and/or empirical support and will investigate whether their estimates are
robust to differing choices on difficult model specification questions. Careful
observational studies of post-stop outcomes are potentially informative, but
researchers must remember their limits.
4. Exploiting Variations in Enforcers‟ Information About Race
Some studies take advantage of variations in the information about race that is
available to law enforcement. A couple have compared officers‟ traffic enforcement
decisions to truly race-blind decisions: traffic-camera citations185 and citations issued
via aerial surveillance. 186 These are very informative designs, analogous to strong
studies on other discrimination questions—for example, research demonstrating a
182 Robin S. Engel et al., Citizens‟ Demeanor, Race, and Traffic Stops, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
POLICING, supra note 6, at 297-99.
183 Ridgeway, supra note 177, at 34-35.
184 See, e.g., Kirk, supra note 97.
185 Montgomery County Department of Police, “Traffic Stop Data Analysis: Third Report,” 2002.
186 E.H. McConnell & A.R. Scheidegger, Race and Speeding Citations: Comparing Speeding Citations Issued
by Air Traffic Officers With Those Issued by Ground Traffic Officers, Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 2001.
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spike in hiring of women when orchestras adopted blind auditions.187 A limitation is
that race information is not the only difference between the decision processes:
automated and aerial enforcement target only particular unlawful behaviors, whereas
human officers can observe various potential violations. 188 This problem parallels
concerns about traffic benchmark studies that focus on a single speed cutoff.
Several traffic-stop studies have exploited variation in race information in
circumstances that are arguably more similar: day and night. The studies compare
stops at the same clock time but on either side of Daylight Savings Time transitions,
such that they fall either just before or after nightfall. The intuition is that if higher
black stop rates are driven by racial discrimination, the disparity should be reduced at
night, when drivers‟ race is harder to see. Studies in Portland and Cincinnati found
no reduction in disparity at night, concluding that disparities were not caused by
racial discrimination. 189 Studies in Minneapolis and Syracuse reached the opposite
conclusion; the Syracuse study, unlike the others, accounted for variations in artificial
light.190 These studies are very clever. But one interpretive problem is that darkness
(not just clock time) might affect driver or police behavior through other channels,
which the method cannot disentangle from the effect of reduced race information.191
Still, the general strategy of exploiting variations in race information is promising.
However, its potential is limited to narrow contexts: those in which enforcement
decisions can be made without close-range observation of suspects.
5. Lab Experiments on Implicit Biases
Aside from these observational approaches, many lab experiments demonstrate
the prevalence of “implicit racial bias,” including the association of blackness with
criminality.192 For example, Eberhardt et al. showed that police subjects who were
primed subconsciously with crime-related images then paid disproportionate
attention to black faces. 193 Crime-primed officers (bot not non-crime-primed
officers) also strongly tended to pick the wrong black face out of a lineup—a more
187 Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female
Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 737-38 (2000).
188 See Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 6, at 183 (citing these studies and raising this concern).
189 Jeffrey Grogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops from Behind a Veil of
Darkness, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 878 (2006); Terry Schell et al., Police-Community Relations in
Cincinnati: Year Three Evalution Report, Rand Corp. Technical Report 535 (2007).
190 Joseph A. Ritter & David Bael, Detecting Racial Profiling in Minneapolis Traffic Stops, CURA Reporter
Spring/Summer 2009, at 11-17; William C. Horrace & Shawn M. Rohlin, How Dark Is Dark? Bright
Lights, Big City, Racial Profiling (2014) (unpublished), http://www.colgate.edu/docs/defaultsource/d_academics_departments-and-programs_economics_colgate-hamilton-seminarseries/horracerohlindarkness-1-14-14.pdf?sfvrsn=0
191 Darkness certainly affects driving behavior, and could also affect police tactics, or police
perceptions of black criminality. In general, fear of crime is dramatically higher at night. E.g., Kathleen
A. Fox et al., Gender, Crime Victimization, and Fear of Crime, 22 SECURITY JOURNAL 24 (2009).
192 See, e.g., B. Keith Payne et al., Weapon Bias. 15 CURRENT DIR. IN PSYCH. SCIENCE 287 (2006)
(reviewing literature); Quillian, supra note 143, at 314-20 (same); Kirwan Institute, Implicit Bias (2014),
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf (same).
193 Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J PERSONALITY &
SOCIAL PSYCH. 876, 885-88 (2004).
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racially “stereotypical” black face.194 A subset of this literature tests “shooter bias,”
using computer simulations; subjects are asked to “shoot” armed characters but not
unarmed ones. These tests have found that players pick the right response faster if
the image matches stereotypes (armed black or unarmed white characters).195
These studies are randomized experiments—the “gold standard” for causal
inference. Many are quite small. But outside the lab, Internet-administered implicit
bias tests have been taken by millions of people. Some of these test the association
between blackness and weapons, which is prevalent: one analysis found that 72% of
respondents showed this association, and only 9% showed the reverse.196 Internet
administration means test-taking conditions and samples are not controlled and
respondents are not blind to the study‟s purpose. But people who choose to test
themselves might actually be less biased than average, and if anything, most
respondents are presumably trying to achieve an “unbiased” score. Moreover, tests
that use subconscious primes and test quick reactions aren‟t easy to “game.”
This research strongly indicates that implicit racial bias is fairly prevalent,
including among police, but certainly not limited to them. Police and civilian subjects
score similarly, and on some tasks they make fewer mistakes overall.197 As Tonry puts
it, given the bias found among “every imaginable group in the population, it would
be remarkable if criminal justice practitioners were not affected.”198 Surveys have also
shown widespread tendencies to explicitly associate blackness with criminality, 199 as
well as overt endorsement of racial discrimination in other areas among a shrinking
but still nontrivial subset of white respondents.200
The great unknown is how these phenomena translate into real-world decisionmaking by police.201 While researchers have not yet linked implicit bias scores to realworld policing outcomes, such studies may be on the horizon. There are limitations
to this approach, despite its promise: while the tests themselves are controlled
experiments, using their results to explain real-world outcomes involves the usual

194 Id. at 887-88; see also Heather M Kleider et al., Looking Like a Criminal, 40 MEMORY &
COGNITION 1200, 1200 (2012) (reaching similar findings with student subjects).
195 Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer‟s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the Decision to
Shoot, 8 SOC. & PERS. PSYCH. COMPASS 201, 206-07 (2014); Anthony G. Greenwald et al. Targets of
Discrimination: Effect of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCH. 399, 401-03 (2001).
196 Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 2007 EUR. REV.
SOC. PSYCH. 1, 20.
197 Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92
J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 1006; see generally Correll et al., supra note 195 (reviewing literature).
198 Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in the American
Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUSTICE 273, 287 (2010).
199 James D. Unnever, Race, Crime, and Public Opinion, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHNICITY,
CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION 70, 71 (Bucerius & Tonry eds.) (2014).
200 See, e.g., Frank Newport, In U.S., 87% Approve of Black-White Marriage, vs. 4% in 1958,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163697/approve-marriage-blacks-whites.aspx (reporting 2013 poll
showing that only 84% of white Americans approve of interracial marriage).
201 E.g., BLANK ET AL., supra note 84, at 72 (“L]aboratory effects…can rarely tell us the extent to
which naturally observed disparities are the result of discrimination.”).
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causal-inference challenges of observational research. 202 Moreover, the scores‟
explanatory value may understate race‟s total effects on officer decision-making
because they test only specific subconscious mechanisms. Still, this research is a
promising new line of inquiry into one plausible mechanism for disparities.
E. Testing Racial Profiling: The Promise of Auditing
Despite decades of effort, our current methods of evaluating police racial
discrimination leave much unknown. I propose a new method to supplement the
existing toolkit. “Auditing” refers to field studies that compare the treatment of
paired “testers” who are similar but for a characteristic of interest. Such methods are
used often in discrimination research and civil rights law enforcement in areas such
as employment, housing, and lending. I propose to use testers (probably undercover
police) to interact with police or to stage behavior that could attract their attention.
Although it raises potential ethical, safety, legal, and political concerns, which I
address here, this approach has substantial promise, capturing most of the
advantages of lab experiments while directly testing real-world behavior.
1. Auditing in Research and Civil Rights Enforcement
A good example of the auditing approach is Ayres and Siegelman‟s study of race
and sex discrimination by auto dealers.203 The authors matched white male testers
with black male, black female, and white female counterparts based on age,
education, and assessed attractiveness; the testers all wore similar clothing and drove
similar cars to the dealerships, where they negotiated prices on cars; black testers got
substantially worse offers. 204 Other studies have used similar methods to study
housing and employment markets,205 plus various other phenomena—for example, a
recent study found that drivers are less willing to yield to black jaywalkers.206
Instead of live testers, some studies manipulate only fictitious written
information, such as employment applications,207 student emails to professors,208 and
For example, an officer‟s experiences could influence both her IBT scores and her stop practices.
Ian Ayres and Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM.
ECON. REV. 304 (1995).
204 Id. at 306, 319. The evidence of gender discrimination was less clear.
205 E.g., J. Yinger, Measuring Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881 (1986); see
BLANK ET AL., supra note 84, at 106-07 (reviewing housing research); P.A. Riach & J. Rich, Field
Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place, 112 ECON. J. F480, F510-F513 (2002) same); Devah
Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment Discrimination, 609 ANNALS 104, 114
(reviewing employment research); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937
(2003) (studying effects of criminal records and race on employment).
206 Tara Goddard et al., Racial Bias in Driver Yielding Behavior at Crosswalks, Portland State University,
Working Paper, 2, http://ppms.otrec.us/media/project_files/TRF_Crosswalkpaper_Final.pdf; see
BLANK ET AL., supra note 84, at 104-08 (reviewing auditing literature); Riach & Rich, supra note 205;
Pager, supra note 205, at 113 tbl. 1 (same).
207 E.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha
and Jamal?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991 (2004); Pager, supra note 205, at 942-43 (reviewing studies).
208 Katherine L. Milkman et al., What Happens Before? A Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and
Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway into Organizations 24-26 (July 12, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2063742.
202
203
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writing samples.209 Such designs allow true experimental manipulation of race and
gender, which in-person tester studies don‟t quite achieve: one can randomize cases
between testers, but one can‟t make the same tester white in one case and black in
another. Instead, in-person auditing depends on careful matching and training to
minimize within-pair variation.
No similar studies address U.S. law enforcement. In 1994, one criminal
defendant introduced evidence from testers that he had hired to assess whether race
affected Border Patrol stops. But the experiment was tiny and unscientific; the
unpersuaded court observed that many relevant conditions had not been held
constant.210 A Mexico City study used testers who committed illegal left turns to test
perceived-socioeconomic-status effects on police demands for bribes. 211 Another
study focused not on police, but on private party suspicions of crime, testing store
clerks‟ reactions to white and black shoppers. 212 An ABC News mini-experiment
likewise tested private observers: actors cut the lock off a bicycle, and passerby
reactions to the black actor were much more hostile.213
The use of testers is also a well-established civil rights enforcement strategy. In
the 1950s, testers brought suits challenging public transit discrimination, and the
Supreme Court upheld their standing. 214 Testers have played a prominent role in
housing discrimination enforcement; the federal government has funded large tester
studies and backed tester lawsuits brought by local fair housing associations. 215
Testers have also brought challenges to lending discrimination. 216 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has endorsed use of testers to challenge
hiring discrimination,217 though few cases have been brought.218
2. Auditing the Police: Key Research Design Considerations
Is auditing the police realistic? There are some good reasons that this hasn‟t been
done before, 219 but I believe these can be addressed with careful research design.
209 Arin N. Reeves, Written in Black & White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in Racialized Perceptions of
Writing Skills, NEXTIONS 4-6 (Apr. 4, 2014).
210 United States v. Beasley, 36 F.3d 1106, 1994 WL 504182, *4 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished).
211 Brian J. Fried et al., Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad, 45 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010).
212 George E. Schreer et. al, “Shopping While Black”: Examining Racial Discrimination in a Retail Setting,
39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1432 (2009).
213 ABC, What Would You Do? (Bike Thief), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0kV_b3IK9M.
214 Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
215 See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (upholding tester standing); Michael
Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1401, 1426 (1998); M.A. Turner et
al., Discrimination in Metropolitan Housing Markets: National Results from Phase I HDS 2000 (2002).
216 Steve Tomkowiak, Using Testing Evidence in Mortgage Lending Discrimination Cases, 41 URB. LAW. 319,
326-336 (2009).
217 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm., Dec. No. N-915-062, Policy Guidance on the Use of
EEO Testers, Nov. 20, 1990; Julie Lee & Caitlin Liu, Measuring Discrimination in the Workplace, 6 U. CHI.
L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 195, 213 (1999).
218 Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Controlling Bias in Hiring, 68 J.
SOC. ISSUES 238, 256 (2012).
219 Indeed, aside from the Beasley defendant‟s effort, see supra note 210, it has hardly been suggested.
One scholarly piece and one news article each give the idea a sentence or two. Pamela S. Karlan, Race,
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Here, I address several objectives that researchers must balance: safety, legality,
importance, methodological rigor, statistical power, and cost concerns.
Safety. A paramount concern is minimizing risk to testers, police, and third
parties. The research designs I propose below involve no serious law-breaking, nor
do they suggest a violent situation. They are not designed to test arrest probability,
but to potentially elicit relatively minimal police interactions. Testers must be trained
to be absolutely cooperative. The safest approach would involve law enforcement
participation: voluntary or court-ordered police department self-monitoring or
outside civil-rights agency investigations. Ideally, testers could be undercover
agents—people who regularly carry out far riskier work than this—and police
backup could be ready to intervene if any safety threat arises.
The designs proposed below also pose minimal risk to the officers being studied.
With just one or two interactions with each officer, they would be used to diagnose
broad patterns, not to identify individual “bad apples.” They also involve very
minimal officer time, minimizing distraction from ordinary public-safety duties.
Legality. The criminal law constrains staging of actual crimes, lying to the police,
and recording of interactions. 220 This is another advantage of governmental
involvement. Undercover police routinely participate in otherwise-criminal activity
and enjoy effective immunity from prosecution.221 Private testers can‟t be asked to
commit serious crimes, but might choose to risk minor violations, as did researchers
in several studies mentioned above: Lamberth‟s Turnpike study, the jaywalking study,
and the Mexico City bribery study. Most of the designs proposed below involve no
lawbreaking or lying, just potentially suspicious activity.
Importance. Studies should focus on contexts in which there is reason to suspect
discrimination (for example, large raw disparities, or citizen complaints) and in which
discrimination would have meaningful consequences. But such contexts need not
involve serious crimes. Misdemeanor enforcement can result in detention and
substantial collateral consequences, can be highly stressful, may be a pretext to look
for more serious criminality,222 and may be a method of expanding the surveillance
“net,” exposing arrestees to more police interactions in the future.223
Methodological rigor. The most obvious requirement for effective auditing is that
the deception work. The interaction should thus be quite ordinary, brief, and
Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2008 (1998); Emily Badger, Why It‟s
So Hard to Study Racial Profiling By Police, WASH. POST, April 30, 2014. Reviews of methods for studying
racial profiling omit it; for example, Blank et al. don‟t mention auditing in their chapter on police,
supra note 84, at 186-204, even though they endorse it for other contexts like housing, id. at 103-117.
220 In most states, anyone may record their own interactions without permission, though some states
require two-party consent. Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press, Reporter‟s Recording
Guide 2-3, http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/RECORDING.pdf (2010). There may also be a
constitutional right to record police, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-84 (1st Cir. 2011), though
some courts require open recording, Crawford v. Geiger, 996 F.Supp.2d 603, 614 (2014).
221 Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 155, 157, 165-69 (2009).
222 See supra note 121 (discussing Whren). Arrestees may be searched without warrants.
223 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 632-33
(2014).
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forgettable. Observations should be distributed across different police beats and
shifts and across time, so that individual officers are unlikely to notice patterns.
The primary threat to causal inference from auditing studies is tester
heterogeneity,224 so testers should be matched carefully.225 Even so, subtle differences
may remain, but training combined with simple, easy-to-replicate “scripts” can make
these less likely to affect outcomes. Analyses could focus on outcomes, like whether
any interaction occurs, that are unaffected by subtle differences in conversational
styles. Optimally, the testers should be blind to the study‟s purpose (for example,
they could be told they are testing enforcement without mentioning the racial
dimension),226 though this might be hard to pull off. But testers‟ activities could be
recorded and later coded by persons who are blind to the purpose.
One possible interpretive challenge is discerning whether racial differences in
police actions might result from disparities in citizens‟ calls to the police, rather than
police discrimination. With police department cooperation, this mechanism could be
teased out, because the police could collect information on citizen calls.
Statistical power and cost. The sample size must provide sufficient statistical power
to produce reasonably precise estimates.227 Ideally, this means at least hundreds of
observations228--a plausible number (large cities have thousands of officers), provided
the tests are spread across beats and shifts.229 Many published auditing studies have
much smaller samples, allowing them only to detect large effects, and even then,
imprecisely.230 Although larger samples produce greater power, they cost more, and
may increase the risk of police noticing patterns. This is another reason to use
designs that involve low-intensity, brief, forgettable interactions—they can be
repeated more often at reasonable cost. However, the interactions do need to be
designed to elicit police responses reasonably often; to heighten the chance of such
response, testers should be positioned near the known location of officers.
3. Possible Research Designs
Here, I list a few examples of research designs, leaving the details to be tailored
to the city and police force.
See, e.g., James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 108-09 (1998).
See Pager, supra note 205, at 111-12, 123-24. But researchers should avoid too-perfect matches on
traits that themselves signify race (e.g., hair). See Riach & Rich, supra note 205, at F483-F484.
226 See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 203 (using blind testers); Lee & Liu, supra note 217, at 224.
227 Power analyses are typically framed in terms of hypothesis-testing, wherein power is the
probability of obtaining a statistically significant result if the “true” effect is of a certain size. Power
depends on sample size, the size of effect one seeks to detect, the statistical significance threshold,
and (for binary outcomes) the baseline frequency of the outcomes.
228 Sample-size calculators are widely available; they require assumptions about effect size. For
example, if one seeks 80% power with a 95% confidence level, assuming the true probabilities for the
two groups are 30% and 40% respectively, a common power formula requires a total sample size of
708. See “Power (Sample Size) Calculators,” https://www.sealedenvelope.com/power/binarysuperiority/. If the probabilities were 30% and 50%, the sample size required would be smaller (182).
229 For example, the Chicago police department has 279 distinct beats, each patrolled by eight or
nine officers. Chicago Police Department, “Beat Officers,” https://portal.chicagopolice.org/
portal/page/portal/ClearPath/Get%20Involved/How%20CAPS%20works/Beat%20Officers.
230 E.g., Fried et al., supra note 211 (43 tests); Schreer et al, supra note 212, at 1438 (31 tests, 6 stores).
224
225
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Open Container/Minor in Possession. Testers could walk past beat officers carrying a
container of liquid, such as a soda bottle that resembles a beer bottle, testing whether
they‟re asked what‟s in it. If the containers do not actually contain alcohol, suspicion
could be immediately dispelled.
Loitering. Testers, in same-race pairs, could hang out in public, testing whether
police approach. To increase rates of police interactions, testers could engage in
further “nuisance” activity, like playing music or smoking, or wear bulky clothing.
Casing. Testers could wait outside jewelry or other stores, looking in—behavior
that could be construed either as “window-shopping” or “casing.”
Bike or car theft. Testers could break a bike lock or break into a car using a coat
hanger—like the ABC News video described above, but larger-scale. In the car
example, testers could carry the registration so as to dispel suspicion quickly. A
challenge will be objectively differentiating hostile interactions from offers to help.
Traffic violations. Testers could break traffic laws and see if they get stopped (and
searched). While safety would be a concern, some traffic violations could pose little
or no danger—for example, expired or missing license plates.
Checkpoints. Checkpoints are promising settings for auditing: some law
enforcement contact is guaranteed, the location is fixed, the setting is highly
monitored and low-risk, and the testers‟ activity (just passing through) would be
unremarkable. Outcomes could include time elapsed and diversion for extra
searches. Agency cooperation, while not essential, would help; it would allow access
to the information agents obtain when they run individuals‟ identification.
Manipulation of Victim Reports, Police Files, and Training Exercises Other strategies
could avoid in-person police encounters. “Victims” (perhaps themselves of varied
race) could call in crime reports with varied suspect race, to test differences in
dispatchers‟ response (assuming a mechanism is in place to quickly cancel the
investigation). Race could be manipulated in training exercises involving assessment
of case files or descriptions. Manipulation of police files could also be used to test
prosecutors‟ charging or intake decisions.
Responding to Citizen Complaints. Officers that staff citizen outreach or internal
affairs departments could be tested to see if they respond differently to complaints
about officers depending on the complainant‟s race. 231 The test should focus on
initial intake, with a mechanism for stopping the ensuing investigations.
4. Advantages and Limitations
In real life, race mediates the lives people lead, but auditing measures disparate
treatment of individuals who are doing the same thing in the same places. This is
both a strength and a limitation. On the one hand, it enables sound causal inferences:
if we eliminate differences other than race, we can more confidently attribute
disparate outcomes to racial discrimination. Auditing designs would be much better
231 See, e.g., New York Comm‟n to Combat Police Corruption, Follow-Up Review of the Internal Affairs
Bureau Command Center 1-5, 17 (1999) (describing center that takes 20,000 complaints per year). See also
Douglas S. Massey & Garvey Lundy, Use of Black English and Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing
Markets, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 452, 456-59 (2001) (discussing phone-based auditing studies).
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tailored to isolate the effects of racial discrimination than regression studies and
other observational approaches. If testers are matched and trained well, it could
approximate a true experiment, but in a real-life setting, not a lab.232
But auditing may miss dimensions of real-world racial discrimination. For
example, if the police heavily target young men who dress a certain way, and virtually
all such young men are black, perhaps clothing style is not a confounder that should
be filtered out via the use of identically dressed testers, but rather a race proxy—a
mechanism for racially disparate treatment. Similarly, most of the designs above
would test disparities within neighborhoods (or at checkpoints), and would miss
differences driven by neighborhood racial composition.
The auditing design could, however, be extended to test the effects of such racecorrelated variables and their interaction with race—for example, by changing the
same testers‟ clothing and/or sending them to different neighborhoods. An
advantage over observational studies of inter-neighborhood disparities is that this
approach could rule out inter-neighborhood differences in individuals‟ behavior,
although it would not necessarily rule out all other neighborhood differences.
Similarly, evidence that the police disfavor some characteristic like a clothing style
would not definitively prove that they are using it as a race proxy.
Auditing would produce context-specific estimates, not an overall measure of
racial discrimination in stops or arrests.233 These estimates will be more informative if
the test is similar to some class of activity that produces a reasonable share of the
department‟s stops or arrests. Loitering and minor-in-possession are good examples.
5. Implementation
Given its longstanding role in civil rights enforcement, federal or state agencies‟
use of auditing to assess police disparities is plausible. Tester programs in other areas
have sometimes been controversial,234 and may well be in this context as well, but
there are countervailing political pressures. In surveys, large majorities oppose racial
profiling. 235 DOJ‟s Civil Rights Division has a strong interest in the issue and in
police abuses generally, 236 and the issue has been an especially high overall DOJ
priority in the wake of the Ferguson shooting.237

232 See Quillian, supra note 143, at 303 (“[A]udit studies often are the best method for
measuring…discrimination.”).
233 Cf. Heckman, supra note 224, at 102-11 (criticizing employment audit studies for not providing
estimates of market discrimination).
234 See Selmi, supra note 215, at 1427; Alex Young K. Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect
Discrimination, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1473, 480 (1993) (citing employer fears of tester litigation).
235 Emily Eakins, Poll: 70% of Americans Oppose Racial Profiling by the Police, Reason-Rupe Poll, Oct. 14,
2014, http://reason.com/poll/2014/10/14/poll-70-of-americans-oppose-racial-profi.
236 Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/polmis.php; U.S. DEP‟T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
RIGHTS DIV., GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES (2003), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf.
237 Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder, Latest Developments in Federal Civil Rights
Investigation in Ferguson, MO (Aug. 14, 2014).
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Outside-agency auditing would lose some of the advantages of policedepartment self-monitoring (for example, access to internal data), but it would
otherwise retain the advantages of being able to use trained undercover officers and
protect them from physical or legal harm. The outside-enforcement approach would
face less risk of being compromised by leaks or internal resistance. It is the most
plausible strategy when a police department is hostile to scrutiny. Auditing could also
be required by court order or settlement in civil rights litigation. Analogously, a
major benchmarking study was carried out by the New Jersey Attorney General‟s
office pursuant to a settlement with DOJ, 238 and outside monitors have been
appointed for numerous police departments under consent decrees.239
Voluntary self-auditing by police departments is promising, but is it realistic?
After all, adverse findings could be embarrassing and invite litigation. Moreover, the
studies could be resource-intensive and risk angering officers and unions or even the
undercover testers themselves. Still, while many departments would doubtless reject
the idea, the 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the U.S. are not monolithic, and
there may well be some who embrace the idea. Typically, agency heads are political
appointees, and there is no reason to assume that all cities‟ political leaders would be
primarily interested in hiding racial discrimination, rather than eliminating it.
Hundreds of police departments have already invested considerable resources in
collecting racial disparity data, and many have carried out ambitious studies.240 Some
police departments have “early warning” programs to identify individual problem
officers. 241 Any of these programs risks litigation or officer backlash—indeed,
programs that risk getting individual officers in trouble may raise a worse risk of
backlash than auditing does.242 These risks have not precluded their adoption.
There is substantial precedent for undercover police work to help departments
self-diagnose problems. Some departments use a practice called “red teaming” to test
police responses to security threats and emergency situations.243 Undercover agents
are also often employed in police corruption investigations. 244 Several police
See Lange et al, supra note 205, at 196-97.
Floyd v. City of New York, 08-CIV-1034, Statement of Interest of the United States, June 2, 2013
(advocating court appointment of monitor); Barbara Attard, Oversight of Law Enforcement Is Beneficial and
Needed—Both Inside and Out, 30 PACE L. REV.1548, 1550 (2010).
240 See, e.g., Engel et al., supra note 60; Ctr. for Policing Equity, What We‟ve Done,
http://cpe.psych.ucla.edu/what-weve-done (describing CPE‟s work with police departments).
241 Engel & Calnon, supra note 41, at 109; see Ridgeway, supra, at 21-30.
242 Unions generally strongly oppose policies with potential adverse consequences for individual
officers. Engel & Calnon, supra note 41, at 109; Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to
Police Officer Accountability?, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 198-99 (2005).
243 The term comes from military wargaming exercises. Michael K. Meehan, Red Teaming for Law
Enforcement, POLICE CHIEF; see Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Subject Bibliography: Red Teaming,
http://fbilibrary.fbiacademy.edu/bibliographies/redteaming.pdf (collecting sources); William H.
Adcox, The Red Team: An Innovative Quality Control Practice in Facility Security, 74 POLICE CHIEF (2007)
(describing “breach exercises” carried out by undercover teams at protected facilities).
244 E.g., Steve Rothlein, Conducting Integrity Tests on Law Enforcment Officers, Legal Liability and Risk
Management Institute, http://www.llrmi.com/articles/legal_update/le_integrity_tests.shtml (2010);
see Tim Prenzler & Carol Ronken, Police Integrity Testing in Australia, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. J. 319,
238
239
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departments (including New York and Los Angeles) regularly conduct “random
integrity tests”—exposing officers to random stings. 245 Corruption is likely as
embarrassing to police departments as racial discrimination is—yet these
departments have carried out the corruption equivalent of auditing.
But even if departments can be persuaded to undertake auditing studies, can they
be trusted not to undermine their accuracy? Internal affairs divisions and police
leadership have often been sharply criticized for papering over police misconduct
and corruption. 246 Under the right conditions, however, the prospects for
effectiveness are reasonable. Self-studies will be more credible if undertaken together
with outside watchdog organizations or academic researchers who have control over
data collection and analysis247--provided those outside actors are truly independent.248
Undercover agents, presumably borrowed from other departments, would have to be
carefully chosen, because they would have to be trusted not to tip off other officers
or to try to manipulate the study‟s findings.249
If police departments are reluctant to expose themselves to criticism and liability,
or to anger their own officers, they could conduct internal auditing programs without
publicizing results, or ask academic collaborators to publish anonymized results. To
encourage self-studies, legislatures could consider enacting statutory evidentiary
privileges. Congress has enacted just such “self-testing” privileges for mortgage
lenders and creditors in the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act.250 These apply only if, upon discovering evidence of discrimination, the lender
undertakes “appropriate corrective action.”251 If legislatures applied similar privileges
to police self-testing, they would be modest extensions of the “self-criticism
privileges” that law enforcement agencies already often invoke (which cover
subjective analyses but not underlying facts).252
319 (2001) (describing undercover integrity testing in Australia as an “essential” anticorruption tool).
245 Rothlein, supra note 244; Prenzler & Ronken, supra note 244, at 321-23; Sanja Kunjak Ivkovic, 93
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 617-19 (2003).
246 E.g., Ivkovic, supra note 245, at 596-97.
247 This is the modus operandi of the Center for Policing Equity, which connects researchers with
police departments. Center for Policing Equity, What We Do, http://cpe.psych.ucla.edu/. See Merrick
Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. REV. 151, 159-63 (2003)
(describing some departments‟ voluntary use of accountability organizations, independent
investigators, and civilian review boards to monitor use of force and corruption).
248 Civilian oversight boards have often been criticized for being overly deferential to police. E.g.,
Stephen Clarke, Note, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Study of How Civilian Oversight of the Police Should
Function and How it Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 11-12 (2009). Academic researchers with
external (non-police) funding may be better equipped to provide accountability, but it will be
important to negotiate agreements preserving researchers‟ control over reporting of results.
249 Riach & Rich, supra note 205, at F483, worry that “consciously or unconsciously, minority
applicants may be motivated to prove the existence of discrimination.” See Heckman, supra note 224,
at 104. When police are investigating police, one might worry more about the opposite concern.
250 See Tomkowiak, supra note 216, at 326-27.
251
Id.; see ADI Consulting, The Self-Testing Privilege for Fair Lending Compliance,
http://www.adiconsulting.com/Docs/2006%20FL%20Self-Testing%20Privilege.pdf (also describing
some similar privileges developed by states).
252 See Josh Jones, Note, Behind the Shield? Law Enforcement Agencies and the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege,
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If government involvement proves impracticable, academic researchers might be
able to carry out some of the designs on their own. Academic research is by
Institutional Review Board oversight, 253 but IRBs generally focus on harms to
subjects (here, police) and perhaps third parties. Here, essentially all the risk is on the
research staff (the testers).254 But while the IRB may not regulate such risks, ethical
researchers should consider them. While well-informed research staff should be free
to take on non-zero risks (as much research does), supervisors should aim to keep
this risk minimal, especially if they are students, who may be reluctant to refuse.
Overall, while auditing designs could face serious practical and political hurdles,
their use is plausible. They offer a potentially valuable new addition to the toolkit of
researchers, civil rights agencies, and police departments.
CONCLUSION
There is no single correct empirical method for assessing racial disparities in
policing, because there is no single correct normative conception of what kind of
inequality we should care about. I have focused my analysis principally on how to get
at two estimands that I consider especially important: first, racial disparity in police
interactions conditional on criminal conduct, and second, the effects of police racial
discrimination. The policing-crime comparisons that have dominated the literature
give a skewed sense of the first, generally overcorrecting for crime differences.
Meanwhile, several available methods for assessing police racial discrimination are
useful, but are limited by various causal-inference and external-validity concerns;
auditing, despite its challenges, is an appealing alternative.
Some will no doubt disagree with me as to what the most important empirical
questions are. I hope that this discussion might persuade those with different views
to articulate them clearly and to employ statistical analyses and numerical
comparisons that are consistent with their normative premises. An empirical analysis
that is well designed to answer one question may produce dramatically wrong
conclusions if it is misinterpreted as an answer to another. The conceptual
confusions that have pervaded public and scholarly debates about race and policing
are not merely a matter of laypeople misunderstanding statistics or activists
strategically misusing them. One can hardly expect more out of the public debate
when much of the underlying empirical literature is itself riddled with the same
problems. We can and should do better.

60 WASH. & LEE LAW REVIEW 1609, 1611-14 (2003). Federal privilege legislation could be grounded
in Congress‟s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, and could perhaps extend to state courts.
253 This may be true even if researchers work with government, depending on their roles.
254 Research guidelines also generally permit dispensing with informed consent if the research design
requires it (as it does here) and the potential harm is minimal. See Pager, supra note 205, at 126.
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APPENDIX
Tables
Table A1. Examples Assuming Racial Equality Conditional on Conduct
Guilty Stop Rate: SG/PG
Innocent Stop Rate: SI/PI
Black Guilt Rate: PGB/PB
White Guilt Rate: PGW/PW
Num. Black: PB
Num. White: PW
Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio
(SB/ SW)
(PGB /PGW)
Stop Share/Crime Share
(SB/ S)
(PGB /PG)
Hit Rate Ratio
(SGB/SB)
(SGW/SW)

[1]
50%
25%
40%
20%
1000
1000

[2]
25%
25%
40%
20%
1000
1000

[3]
50%
5%
40%
20%
1000
1000

[4]
50%
5%
8%
4%
1000
1000

[5]
50%
5%
8%
2%
1000
1000

[6]
50%
25%
96%
92%
1000
1000

[7]
50%
25%
40%
20%
1000
4000

[8]
50%
25%
40%
20%
4000
1000

[9]
50%
25%
20%
20%
1000
1000

0.58

0.5

0.82

0.63

0.36

0.98

0.58

0.58

1

0.81

0.75

0.93

0.84

0.74

0.99

0.68

0.93

1

1.71

2

1.22

1.58

2.74

1.02

1.71

1.71

1

General notes:
a. All scenarios apply the same stop rates to people with the same criminal conduct, regardless of race. The
first six lines show hypothetical assumptions; the bottom three lines show ratios calculated based on those
assumptions. All assume higher black crime rates (except [9], which assumes no difference), paralleling
the usual argument made in defense of policing disparities.
b. Although all the stop rates in these examples are higher than one would find in most real-world policing
contexts, one could divide every stop rate by 10 (or by anything) and it would not affect any of the ratios.
c. The Hit Rate Ratio is discussed in Part II.D. It is 1 if stops are equally productive (likely to succeed in
catching a criminal) across racial groups. Note that here, policing is racially equitable conditional on
conduct, but (except in Column 9, where there is no crime difference) hit rates are never aligned.
Notes on each column:
[1] parallels the Table 1 example in the text.
[2] and [3] vary the degree to which the police accurately discern guilt (i.e., varies the gap between innocent
and guilty stop rates). The Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures are less misleading when the police
are more discerning, because there are fewer stops of the innocent.
[4] lowers guilt rates for both races. Although (as in [3]) the police are ten times as likely to stop the guilty,
61% of stops overall are of the innocent, and the Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures perform badly.
[5] further lowers the white guilt rate. With a larger crime-rate difference, the measures are even more
misleading.
[6] is the same as [1] except guilt rates are very high. With few innocents, and thus few stops of the innocent,
the Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures are close to the true ratio of stops among the guilty.
[7] and [8] are the same as [1] except that the relative population sizes vary. Only the Share/Share
measure changes as a result. It is always closer to 1 than the Ratio/Ratio measure, and is more “diluted”
in this sense the larger the high-crime group‟s population share is.
[9] is the same as [1] except it eliminates the crime-rate disparity. The problems with the Ratio/Ratio and
Share/Share measures disappear; they emerge only when there are crime-rate differences.
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Table A2. Examples Assuming Racial Disparity Conditional on Conduct
Black Guilty Stop %: SGB/PGB
White Guilty Stop %: SGW/PGW
Black Innocent Stop %: SIB/PIB
White Innocent Stop %: SIW/PIW
Black Guilt %: PGB/PB
White Guilt %: PGW/PW
Number Black: PB
Number White: PW
Stop Rate Ratio: Guilty (DG)
(SGB/ SGW)/ (PGB /PGW)
Stop Rate Ratio: Innocent (DI)
(SIB/ SIW)/ (PIB /PIW)
Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio
(SB/ SW)/ (PGB /PGW)
Stop Share/Crime Share
(SB/ S)/ (PGB /PG)
Average Stop Rate Ratio, Holding
Guilt Constant at Black Mean
(Weighted Mean of DG and DI)
Hit Rate Ratio
(SGB/SB)/(SGW/SW)

[1]
50%
25%
30%
15%
40%
20%
1000
1000

[2]
50%
20%
20%
15%
20%
10%
1000
1000

[3]
40%
30%
25%
10%
20%
10%
1000
1000

[4]
50%
50%
50%
10%
20%
10%
1000
1000

[5]
40%
70%
20%
35%
20%
10%
1000
1000

[6]
40%
70%
20%
35%
20%
10%
1000
4000

[7]
40%
70%
20%
35%
20%
10%
4000
1000

[8]
50%
25%
30%
15%
20%
20%
1000
1000

1.67

2.5

1.33

1

0.57

0.57

0.57

2

1.67

1.33

2.5

5

0.57

0.57

0.57

2

0.97

0.84

1.17

1.79

0.31

0.31

0.31

2

0.99

0.94

1.05

1.17

0.58

0.40

0.80

1.33

1.67

1.63

2

2.78

0.57

0.57

0.57

2

1.72

2.98

1.14

0.56

1.83

1.83

1.83

1

General Notes
a. The first eight lines are assumptions; the last six are calculated ratios that represent different possible
measures of disparity. In addition to the measures from Table 1A, this table includes DI, DG, and a
weighted average of the two called the “Average Stop Rate Ratio Holding Guilt Constant at Black Mean.”
These measures were not included in Table 1A because there we were assuming no disparities in stop rates
conditional on conduct (so all of them would have been 1).
b. The Average Stop Rate Ratio line represents one of several reasonable ways of averaging the stop rate ratio
among the guilty and the stop rate ratio among the innocent to produce an overall average stop rate ratio
conditional on criminal conduct. It reflects a reweighting exercise that compares an observed outcome to a
counterfactual outcome. It asks: By what proportion does the number of black stops differ from the number
that we would have seen if the white conditional stop probabilities had been applied to the black population?
This proportion can be expressed as:
⁄

⁄

This proportion represents the multiplicative effect on stops of applying the black conditional stop probabilities
(instead of the counterfactual white ones) to the black population—or, put another way, it is the average
disparity holding guilt rates constant at the black average. In the notes on Proof 3, I discuss two other,
similar ways one might reasonably estimate “average disparity” conditional on conduct, holding guilt rates
constant either at the white average or at the overall population average. All three versions always produce
average stop rate ratios that fall between DI and DG.
Notes on each column
[1] parallels the Table 2 example in the text.
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[2] and [3] likewise assume that black pedestrians are much more likely to be stopped conditional on
criminal conduct, but here disparities are not uniform across criminal conduct conditions. The disparity is
larger among the guilty in [2] and the innocent in [3]. The Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures
again mask these disparities, or (in [2]) reverse their apparent direction. One might expect disparities
that are similar across conduct conditions (as in [1]) if police are paying more attention across the board
to black pedestrians, or have stationed more officers in their neighborhoods. One might expect greater
disparity among the guilty (as in [2]) if the police both are paying more attention to black pedestrians and
are more accurate in discerning their guilt. One might expect greater disparity among the innocent (as in
[1]) if the police lower the suspicious-behavior bar for stopping black pedestrians, affecting mostly the
innocent.
[4] again assumes racial disparity conditional on conduct, disfavoring blacks, but this time it is entirely
driven by a large disparity in stops of the guilty. In scenarios with dissimilar disparities among the
innocent and the guilty, it is possible for the Ratio/Ratio and Share/Share measures to be higher than
DI but lower than DG(or vice-versa), whereas in most of the examples they are lower than both. (The
opposite scenario would also be possible.) However, the Ratio/Ratio measure systematically misleads in a
particular direction in the sense that it always appears to be more favorable to the higher-crime group than
the true average stop rate ratio conditional on criminal conduct.
[5] through [7] show examples in which we assume the true disparity cuts the other direction: white stop rates
are higher conditional on criminal conduct. The Ratio/Ratio measure now substantially exaggerates
the disparity, making it look like white pedestrians are only 31% as likely to be stopped as black
pedestrians, conditional on criminal conduct (when the actual assumed ratio is 57%). The only difference
between these three columns is the group population sizes, which affect the Share/Share measure only.
When true disparities conditional on criminal conduct cut in favor of the higher-crime group, the
Share/Share measure does not always mislead in the same direction, because of its “dilution” toward 1
(relative to the Ratio/Ratio measure), which is more pronounced when the group whose shares are being
compared (here, blacks) is a larger share of the population.
[8] shows an example that parallels [1], except with equal black and white crime rates. The Ratio/Ratio
measure is no longer misleading—it matches the actual average stop rate ratio. The Share/Share ratio is
closer to 1, as in all examples.
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Proofs
Proof 1.
This proof shows that when there is racial equality in policing rates conditional on criminal conduct, but crime
rates differ and not all stops are of the guilty, the higher-crime group always appears relatively “underpoliced”
according to the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio and Stop Share/Crime Share measures. The proof begins by
showing that the Ratio/Ratio measure is less than 1 under these conditions (with the higher-crime group in
the numerator), and proceeds to show that the Share/Share measure is also less than 1.
Definitions:
Group 1

Group 2

Combined

Populations
Stops
*Subscripts I and G denote innocent and guilty subsets.

Assumptions:
(a)

Group 1 has a higher crime rate.

(b)

Equal stop rates of innocent.

(c)

Equal stop rates of guilty.

(d)

For both groups,

⁄
⁄
⁄
⁄

and

are > 0.

⁄
⁄
(1) Apply Population definitions to (a).

(2) Rearrange terms.
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(3) Simplify (subtract 1 from both sides).
(4) Divide by equivalent terms.
[From (b), we know

]

(

)

(

)

(5) Simplify and rearrange terms.
(6) Add equivalent terms.
[From (c), we know

}

(7) Simplify.

(

)

(

)

(8) Apply Stops definitions.
⁄

(9) Rearrange.

( )

⁄
⁄
⁄

(10) Continuing from step (8), add identical
terms.
(11) Simplify.

(

)

(

)

(12) Apply Stops & Population definitions.

(13) Rearrange.

⁄
⁄

( )
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Proof 2
This proof demonstrates that if the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio measure is less than 1, the Stop Share/Crime
Share measure is greater than the Ratio/Ratio measure. Above, in the second half of Proof 1, it was
demonstrated that under this condition the Share/Share measure is also less than 1. Both proofs also work if
all inequalities are reversed. Taken together, the implication is that the Stop Share/Crime Share measure is
always closer to 1 than the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio is, unless both are exactly 1. Definitions are the same
as in Proof 1.

⁄

⁄

⁄(

⁄

⁄

⁄(

)
)

(1) Rearrange terms.

(2) Add identical terms.
(3) Simplify.

(

)

(

)

(4) Rearrange terms.
(
(

)
)

⁄

⁄(

)

⁄

⁄(

( )

(6) Rearrange terms.

)
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Proof 3a.
Definitions are the same as in Proof 1. The first step in this proof shows that the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio
measure is always less than the Average Stop Rate Ratio as defined in the notes to Table A2 above, with the
higher-crime group (labeled Group 1 here) in the numerator of all ratios. Recall that this version of the
Average Stop Rate Ratio represents the average effect of the inter-group conditional stop probability differences
on Group 1. (Using the parlance of the reweighting literature, this could be called the “average treatment
effect on the treated,” expressed as a likelihood ratio.) The numerator of the ratio is the observed number of
stops in Group 1; the denominator is the number that would have been observed in Group 1 if the
distribution of guilt and innocence had been the same, but Group 2‟s stop probabilities (conditional on
criminal conduct) had applied instead.
Assumptions
(a)

Group 1 has a higher crime rate, so:

(b)

For both groups,

and

are > 0.

⁄
⁄

⁄

⁄

(1) Rearrange terms from (a).

(2) Multiply by identical terms.
(

(3) Apply Stops definition.

)

(4) Rearrange.
(5) Divide both sides by

.

(6) Invert both sides and reverse
inequality.

⁄

⁄

⁄

⁄

⁄
⁄

Proof 3b.
This next proof, which proceeds along extremely similar lines, shows that the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio
measure is also always less than an alternative measure of average stop-rate disproportionality conditional on
criminal conduct—one that holds guilt rates constant at Group 2‟s average instead. This measure represents
the likelihood ratio associated with applying Group 1‟s conditional stop probabilities (instead of Group 2‟s)
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to Group 2 (which could be called the “average treatment effect on the untreated”). Assumptions and
definitions are the same as above. Note that the overall “average treatment effect” for the population as a
whole would be an average of these two versions of the Average Stop Rate Ratio, weighted by the sizes of
Groups 1 and 2. It thus follows from Proofs 3a and 3b that that overall average would also always be
higher than the Stop Ratio/Crime Ratio measure.
⁄

⁄

⁄

⁄

(1) Rearrange terms from (a).

(2) Multiply by identical terms.
(3) Apply Stops definition.

(

)

(5) Rearrange.
(6) Divide both sides by PG1S2
and rearrange.

⁄

⁄

⁄

⁄
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